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AbstRAct
The process of  liberalization of  international trade and of  Foreign Di-
rect Investment (FDI) has constituted a broadly accepted trend during the 
last few decades and FDI inflows have expanded constantly since the end 
of  the 1980’s. However, signs of  a certain crisis of  the positive and one-way 
attitude towards international trade and FDI exist nowadays. The increase in 
the flux of  FDI coming from developing and emerging countries to deve-
loped economies, the sudden relevance of  foreign sovereign investors, the 
changing environment for national security or the quest to protect techno-
logies and sectors of  the economy considered vital for the host country, its 
sovereignty and competitiveness are creating a new reality that impacts on 
both, the global fluxes of  FDI and its regulation. Tension exists between the 
commitment towards freedom of  FDI and the right of  the state to ensure 
that certain legitimate public interests and goals can be fully implemented. 
This may lead to the protection of  certain strategic sectors of  the economy 
of  the country or flagship firms from foreign investment on national securi-
ty or related grounds. The current revision of  the great paradigms on which 
FDI, and its legal framework, stand is ascertainable in the growing recourse 
by states to the development of  some measures devoted to prevent the en-
trance of  FDI in the country under certain circumstances.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Foreign investment and natio-
nal security. Freedom of  Investment. Control of  FDI. Barriers to foreign in-
vestment. Screening systems of  control. Restrictions to foreign investment.
Resumo
O processo de liberalização do comercio internacional e do investi-
mento direto estrangeiro (FDI) tem constituído um assunto amplamente 
aceito durante as últimas décadas e o fluxo do FDI tem sido expandido 
constantemente desde finais dos anos 1980´s. Porém, existem atualmente 
sinais de certa crise da atitude positiva sobre o comércio internacional e 
FDI. O aumento do fluxo de IED proveniente de países emergentes e em 
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desenvolvimento para economias desenvolvidas, a súbi-
ta relevância de investidores soberanos estrangeiros, o 
ambiente em transformação para a segurança nacional 
ou a procura da proteção de tecnologias e setores da 
economia considerados vitais para o país anfitrião, sua 
soberania e competitividade estão criando uma realida-
de que afeta tanto os fluxos globais de IDE quanto sua 
regulamentação. Existe uma tensão entre o compromis-
so com a liberdade do IDE e o direito do Estado de 
assegurar que certos interesses públicos legítimos pos-
sam ser plenamente implementados. Isso pode levar à 
proteção de certos setores estratégicos da economia do 
país ou de firmas emblemáticas do investimento estran-
geiro em segurança nacional ou áreas relacionadas. A 
atual revisão dos grandes paradigmas sobre os quais o 
FDI e seu arcabouço legal, se encontra é verificável no 
crescente recurso dos Estados ao desenvolvimento de 
algumas medidas destinadas a impedir a entrada do FDI 
no país sob certas circunstâncias.
Palavras-chave: Investimento estrangeiro direto (FDI). 
Investimento estrangeiro e segurança nacional. Contro-
le do FDI. Barreiras ao investimento estrangeiro. Siste-
ma de controle. Restrições ao investimento estrangeiro.
1. IntRoductIon
The process of  liberalization of  international trade 
and of  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has constituted 
a broadly accepted trend during the last few decades.1 In 
contrast with other periods of  time in history, since the 
beginning of  1990s FDI is, as a matter of  principle, wel-
comed in most countries.2 National entry conditions for 
1  GOLUB, Stephen S. Measures of  Restrictions on Inward Foreign Di-
rect Investment for OECD Countries. Paris: OECD, 2003. p. 1. (Eco-
nomic Department Working Papers, No. 357, OECD Publishing). 
p. 1.
2  The growth of  FDI has traditionally been considered an el-
ement for stability and peace that is much stronger than trade or 
portfolio investment. As an example of  the implementation of  
the theory of  self-enforcing cooperation, the greater the exposure 
of  one country to FDI coming from another country is, the con-
flict with that country is less possible. ROSECRANCE, Richard; 
THOMPSON, Peter. “Trade, Foreign Investment, and Security”. 
Annual Review of  Political Science, v. 6, p. 390-391, 2003. At the same 
time, the more trade a country has with another country, fewer pos-
sibilities to enter into conflicts with that country exist because the 
mutual dependence makes conflict more costly, see DIXIT, Avinash. 
“International Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Security”. The 
Annual Review of  Economics, v. 3, p. 191, 2011.
MNEs have been liberalized, the operation of  foreign 
affiliates once established in the host country has been 
facilitated and measures of  all kinds to attract FDI have 
been implemented, for instance, the establishment of  
investment promotion agencies.3 
FDI inflows have expanded constantly since the end 
of  the 1980’s. World FDI flows averaged around US$50 
billion at the beginning of  the 1980s. They jumped to 
US$ 200 billion by 1990 and 25 years later, reached 
US$1.23 trillion in 2014,4 two thirds of  its 2007 pick.5 
In 2016, Global FDI flows decreased flows decreased 
by 7 per cent to US$ 1 625 billion compared to 2015.6 
However, signs of  a certain crisis of  the positive and 
one-way attitude towards international trade and FDI 
exist today. Nowadays emerging economies are in many 
cases major players in the world economy and play a 
leading role in the field of  FDI.7 The increase in the flux 
3  SAUVANT, Karl P. FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise, Policy 
Research Working Paper 5052, The World Bank Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Management Network, International Trade Depart-
ment World Bank, Washington, September 2009. p. 3. Around 8 
000 different FDI promotion agencies are said to exist worldwide. 
ECONOMOU, Persephone; SAUVANT, Karl P. “Recent Trends 
and Issues in Foreign Direct Investment 2010”. Yearbook on Interna-
tional Investment Law & Policy, v. 3, p. 1, 2010-2011. And the number 
of  members of  the World Association of  Investment Promotion 
Agencies (WAIPA) —the Association of  Investment Promotion 
Agencies which was established in 1995- increases constantly and it 
has today 170 members from 130 countries (Note World Associa-
tion of  Investment Promotion Agencies, <http://waipa.org/> ac-
cessed 11 November 2017). At the same time and with the final goal 
of  fostering the competitiveness of  national firms, many countries 
also support outwards FDI by national investors by, for example, 
providing them with information about investment opportunities, 
helping them to obtain feasibility studies, offering insurance for out-
wards FDI projects or concluding bilateral treaties for the protec-
tion and promotion of  FDI.
4  For an analysis of  the development of  flows, note OECD. FDI 
in Figures. April 2017. 1-2. Available in: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/
inv/investment-policy/FDI-in-Figures-April-2017.pdf>. Access 
on: 13 Jul. 2018.
5  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPEMENT. World Investment Report 2015. Reforming Inter-
national Investment Governance. New York and Geneva: United 
Nations, 2015. p. 25; OECD. Roundtable on Freedom of  Investment 20. 
19 March 2014 Summary of  Roundtable discussions by the OECD 
Secretariat. Paris: OECD, 2014. p. 3.
6  ORGNISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT. FDI in Figures. April 2017. 1-2. Available 
in: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/FDI-in-Fig-
ures-April-2017.pdf>. Access on: 27 Nov. 2017.
7  But some countries show a certain inability to accept this reality; 
they still have difficulties to admit the “new kids on the block”, see 
SAUVANT, Karl P. “Is the United States Ready for FDI from Chi-
na? Overview”. In: SAUVANT, Karl P.  (Ed.). Investing in the United 
States Is the US Ready for FDI from China, Studies in International Invest-
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of  FDI coming from developing and emerging coun-
tries to developed economies, the sudden relevance of  
foreign sovereign investors or the increasingly negative 
attitude of  the population towards globalization and 
the socioeconomic effects of  Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As) of  domestic firms by foreigners. As well as the 
changing environment for national security or the quest 
to protect technologies and sectors of  the economy 
considered vital for the host country, its sovereignty and 
competitiveness are creating a new reality that will ne-
cessarily affect both, the legal framework and the global 
fluxes of  FDI.
All these facts, among others, have a direct impact in 
the assessment of  free trade and free flows of  FDI in 
many states, especially developed ones, and leads to the 
implementation of  mechanisms of  control of  FDI on 
national security or related grounds in particular coun-
tries of  the world. Liberalization of  FDI constitutes a 
strong trend that will probably continue in the future. 
However some signs of  “backlash against FDI”8 exist 
that make the regulatory framework less welcoming in 
certain countries as regards foreign investments or, at 
least, as regards foreign investments coming from cer-
tain countries, sovereign-driven FDI or FDI directed to 
certain areas of  the economy. A trend that, in any case, 
may favour a more targeted approach towards FDI 
flows in the near future. 
2. globAlIzAtIon, fRee tRAde And fRee flows 
of fdI In the spotlIght
The phenomenon of  globalization is directly related 
to the liberalization of  international trade and interna-
tional investment.9 They are simultaneously the cause 
and manifestation of  this fact. The three sets of  FDI 
ment. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham/Northampton, 2009. p. 2. 
8  SACHS, Lisa E.; SAUVANT, Karl P., “BITs, DTTs, and FDI 
Flows: An Overview”, In: SAUVANT, Karl P.; SACHS, Lisa E. 
The Effect of  Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows. Oxford: 
OUP, 2009. p. xxvii & lix, xxx. 
9  LEAL-ARCAS, Rafael. “Towards the Multilateralization of  In-
ternational Investment Law”. The Journal of  World Investment & Trade, 
v. 10, p. 865-866, 2009; SALACUSE, Jeswald W. The Three Laws 
of  International Investment. National, Contractual and International 
Frameworks for Foreign Capital. Oxford: OUP, 2013. p. 351-2; 
FONTAGNÉ, Lionel. Foreign Direct Investment and International Trade: 
Complements or Subtitutes? Paris: OECD Science, Technology and 
Industry Working Papers, 1993/03, OECD Publishing, 1993. p. 5.
determinants -economic conditions, the regulatory fra-
mework and investment promotion-10 have lined up 
favourably during the last few decades. And FDI has 
grown steadily due to the combination of  certain fac-
tors of  a varied and differing nature ranging from the 
connectivity revolution and the technological develop-
ments that facilitate the managing of  international bu-
siness systems in an integrated manner, the changing 
pattern of  Competition Law, the procedure of  deregu-
lation undertaken in many economies, the process of  
integration developed in several parts of  the world, the 
increasing liberalization of  international trade or of  
FDI policies by national states.11 
However, globalization has an increasingly negative 
understanding for many people in some countries as 
does free trade in many sectors of  the population, and 
this has a direct and growing influence on the approa-
ch to FDI by some national governments. The idea of  
globalization and international trade, and consequently 
that of  free flows of  FDI, being under siege is sprea-
ding rapidly all over the world. The traditionally rather 
innocuous area of  investment law is nowadays under 
pressure, not only in relation to inwards FDI (IFDI) but 
also as regards to outwards FDI (OFDI).12 More and 
more some developed countries are starting to feel dis-
quiet with respect to the FDI regime that they have hel-
ped construct for decades.13 And the contradictions and 
tensions that have traditionally accompanied FDI are 
now superseded by the rising mistrust towards globali-
10  SAUVANT, Karl P. “The FDI recession has begun”. In: SAU-
VANT, Karl P. et al. FDI Perspectives Issues in International Investment. 
New York: Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International In-
vestment, Columbia University, 2011. p. 7.
11  BITZENIS, Aristidis. Globalization and Foreign Direct In-
vestment. In: BITZENIS, Aristidis, VLACHOS, Vasileios A.; PA-
PADIMITRIOU, Pyrros. (Ed.). Mergers and Acquisitions as the Pillar of  
Foreign Direct Investment. New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2012. p. 10; 
FONTAGNÉ, Lionel. Foreign Direct Investment and International Trade: 
Complements or Subtitutes? Paris: OECD Science, Technology and 
Industry Working Papers, 1993/03, OECD Publishing, 1993. p. 9; 
SACHS, Jeffrey D. “Foreign Investment and the Changing Global 
Economic Reality”. In: ALVAREZ, José E. et al. (Ed.). The Evolving 
International Investment Regime Expectations. Oxford: Realities, Options, 
OUP, 2011. p. xlvii-xlix; LEE, Yong-Shik. Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and Regional Trade Liberalization: A Viable Answer for Eco-
nomic Development? Journal of  World Trade, v. 39, n. 4, p. 701, 2005. 
p. 701, 702. 
12  ALVAREZ, José E. “Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: 
An “Empire of  Law” or the “Law of  Empire”?” Alabama Law Re-
view, v. 609, p. 943-970, 2009. 
13  ALVAREZ, José E. “Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: 
An “Empire of  Law” or the “Law of  Empire”?” Alabama Law Re-
view, v. 609, p. 972-975, 2009.
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zation and free trade that is arising in certain countries.14 
This combination of  factors favours a rapid change 
in the approach to FDI in many states, which takes pla-
ce in an atmosphere of  growing prevention as regards 
some of  the consequences arising out of  globalization 
is rapidly favouring protectionism and creating a new 
element of  pressure on the freedom of  FDI. Foreign 
ownership of  national firms is negatively approached 
by citizens, both in developed and emerging countries.15 
But not only IFDI is under scrutiny, also OFDI may be 
affected by the current reality in many places. 
FDI is more intrusive than trade because it invol-
ves the entire range of  issues related to the process of  
production.16 In fact, the increase in the flux of  FDI 
has been one of  the factors that have led to a big trans-
formation in the industrial structure of  many modern 
economies.17 Developed economies originally produced 
most of  their products at home, but because of  the 
costs, production and plants have been increasingly di-
verted abroad.18 In the 1980s Japanese companies pro-
duced around 5 per cent of  their products overseas and 
it is projected to rise to 24.2 per cent in 2020.19 In the 
case of  the US, in 2013 around 53 per cent of  manufac-
turing companies took advantage of  offshore outsour-
cing and more than two million jobs were outsourced.20 
14  SAUVANT, Karl P. “Driving and Countervailing Forces: A 
Rebalancing of  National FDI Policies”. Yearbook on International In-
vestment Law & Policy, p. 215-234, 2008.
15  SAUVANT, Karl P. “Driving and Countervailing Forces: A 
Rebalancing of  National FDI Policies”. Yearbook on International In-
vestment Law & Policy, p. 244-262, 2008.
16  FDI can compensate trade immobility insofar as FDI former 
exporters can produce and sell abroad even when high tariffs to 
trade are introduced. Note, ROSECRANCE, Richard; THOMP-
SON, Peter. “Trade, Foreign Investment, and Security”. Annual Re-
view of  Political Science, v. 6, p. 394, 2003.
17  SAUVANT, Karl P. “The Rise of  International Investment, 
Investment Agreements and Investment Disputes”. In: SAUVANT, 
Karl P.; WITH CHISWICK-PATTERSON, Michael. (Ed.). Appeals 
Mechanism in International Investment Disputes. New York: OUP, 2008. 
p. 11. 
18  Additionally, manufacturing has shifted to services in many 
modern developed economies ROSECRANCE, Richard; THOMP-
SON, Peter. “Trade, Foreign Investment, and Security”. Annual Re-
view of  Political Science, v. 6, p. 384-385, 2003.
19  CABINET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE. FY2015 Annual Survey of  Corporate Behavior. 
Press Release, Tokio, 26 June 2016. Available in: <http://www.esri.
cao.go.jp/en/stat/ank/h27ank/h27ank_press.pdf>. Access on: 13 
Jul. 2018.
20  STATISTIC BRAIN. Job Overseas Outsourcing Statistics.  Avail-
able in: <http://www.statisticbrain.com/outsourcing-statistics-
by-country/>. Access on: 13 Jul. 2018. In the last US presidential 
It is not only that certain areas of  the economy should 
be preserved from foreign investment for the national 
interest or on national security grounds, it is also that 
national corporations should be deterred in certain ca-
ses and sectors of  the market from investing abroad in 
so far as this is deemed to potentially cause a haemor-
rhage of  jobs, knowledge and standing for the country.
3. A moRe tARgeted AppRoAch towARds fdI 
flows
FDI is increasingly subject to changes. FDI both 
inwards and outwards is not as welcome as before.21 
Liberalization of  trade and investment is approached 
by some countries and social groups as dangerous in 
so far as, and among other reasons, the country may 
rely too much on foreign importations or some key sec-
tors of  the economy or industries may be controlled by 
foreigners or foreign countries. Tension exists between 
the commitment towards freedom of  FDI and the ri-
ght of  the state to ensure that certain legitimate public 
interests and goals can be fully implemented. This may 
lead to the protection of  certain strategic sectors of  the 
economy of  the country or flagship firms from foreign 
investment on national security, national essential secu-
rity interests or related grounds. 
This leads to the existence of  a strong trend to 
provide governments with broader powers to decide 
what FDI they want, and which one they don’t. These 
objectives are ensured and reached through different 
mechanisms and policies fixed by the state itself. And 
it may lead governments, now also from developed 
countries, to pay more attention, among other things, to 
some competing objectives like the safeguard of  special 
national interests or of  essential security interests, the 
promotion of  national champions or the protection of  
certain national industries and critical infrastructures.22. 
election of  2016, the issue of  delocalization and outwards FDI and 
their influence on the loss of  jobs was one of  the issues of  major 
relevance. 
21  WAYMOUTH, Crispin. “Is ‘Protectionism’ a Useful Concept 
for Company Law and Foreign Investment Policy? An EU Perspec-
tive”. In: BERNITZ, Ulf; RINGE, Wolf-Georg. (Ed.). Company Law 
and Economic Protectionism New Challenges to European Integration. Ox-
ford: OUP, 2010. p. 35-6.
22  These policies are based on a comprehensive approach to se-
curity risk management and respond in many cases to the broad 
understanding of  the ideas of  national security or essential secu-
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No state has ever granted unrestricted entry to fo-
reign investors and some limits to them have always 
existed. But nowadays some states and political actors 
are starting to think of  whether they have relinquished 
“too much ‘policy space’” in signing International In-
vestment Agreements (IIAs) that through their inter-
pretation by international arbitration panels may cast 
a “regulatory chill” over domestic measures that are 
considered to be needed to achieve legitimate, non-
-investment policy objectives, not only in the economic 
field but also as regards other ambits like health and 
safety policy objectives, or national security as well as 
human rights or environmental protection.23 They also 
wonder whether it is acceptable that key elements of  
the economy or prominent industries become control-
led by foreign investors, some of  them sovereign driven 
investors belonging to countries that do not always fully 
share their social, economic or democratic ideas. 
The rapid industrialization of  some emerging coun-
tries has raised additional concerns about the access to 
energy and to scarce raw materials. The protection of  
technologies considered vital to national sovereignty 
and competitiveness has also become a relevant issue 
to be taken into account. The control of  these areas has 
now become a political issue with a strong connection 
to the area of  FDI and to the national security of  the 
host state.24 Also terrorism, the changing global geostra-
rity interests. Vid., OECD. Building Trust and Confidence in International 
Investment. Report by countries participating in the “Freedom of  
Investment” Process March 2009. Paris: OECD, 2009. p. 10. This 
means new rules on FDI or more rigorous enforcement of  existing 
ones; a greater degree of  conditionality attached to regulatory ap-
proval mechanisms in the host state; or reference to a more expan-
sive notion of  strategic industries, the national interest and national 
security. THOMSEN, Stephen; MISTURA, Fernando. Is investment 
protectionism on the rise? Evidence from the OECD FDI Regulatory Restric-
tiveness Index OECD Global Forum on International Investment. Paris: 
OECD, 2017. p. 1. Sometimes, the mere disapproving pronounce-
ments by the government or fears of  a popular backlash are enough 
to stop a potential cross-border investment in its tracks. Vid. also, 
SAUVANT, Karl P.; ORTINO, Federico. Improving the International 
Investment Law and Policy Regime: Options for the Future. Helsinki: 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of  Finland, 2013. p. 38.
23  SPEARS, Suzanne A. “The Quest for Policy Space in a New 
Generation of  International Investment Agreements”. Journal of  In-
ternational Economic Law, v. 13, n. 4, p. 1037-1040, 2010. Also consid-
er, OECD. Interim report approved by the OECD Investment Committee at 
the fourth OECD Roundtable on Freedom of  Investment. National Security 
and “Strategic” Industries on 30 March 2007 (reproduced in OECD, 
International Investment Perspectives: Freedom of  Investment in a 
Changing World. Paris: OECD, 2007. p. 55.
24  ORGNISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT. Interim report approved by the OECD Invest-
tegic environment and the current atmosphere of  secu-
ritization have generated additional concerns as regards 
FDI and have also favoured a change in the way FDI re-
gulation is approached in certain countries. It is not only 
a question of  preventing foreign firms from controlling 
strategic industries or firms, or playing a key role in the 
national economy, of  protecting national cultural iden-
tity or avoiding national security concerns.25 It is said to 
be more than that: it is an issue of  fear of  transference 
of  R&D departments, a sell-out of  national resources, 
unfair subsidising, a lowering of  environmental standar-
ds, industrial espionage, insufficient protection of  intel-
lectual property or loss of  jobs in developed countries.26
Fears increase further when the investment is under-
taken by MNEs belonging to emergent countries, some 
of  them with a high participation of  foreign govern-
ments in their control, governance and determination 
of  their final aims.27 There are growing concern by sta-
tes and public opinion about the compatibility of  FDI, 
or at least of  FDI coming from certain countries and 
targeting certain areas of  the economy, with the pro-
tection and safeguarding of  some values, policies and 
objectives of  the host state in certain areas.28
3.1. Potential national security threats 
generated by FDI
In addition to certain purely social and economic 
problems related to the potential change of  domicile 
of  the acquired enterprise, the loss of  jobs that it can 
imply or the change in its management, some particu-
lar fears specifically related to national security issues 
ment Committee at the fourth OECD Roundtable on Freedom of  Investment. 
National Security and “Strategic” Industries on 30 March 2007 (re-
produced in OECD, International Investment Perspectives: Free-
dom of  Investment in a Changing World. Paris: OECD, 2007. p. 54.
25  SAUVANT, Karl P. “Driving and Countervailing Forces: A 
Rebalancing of  National FDI Policies”. Yearbook on International In-
vestment Law & Policy, p. 233, 2008.
26  HEINEMANN, Andreas. ‘Government Control of  Cross-
Border M&A: Legitimate Regulation or Protectionism? Control of  
Cross-Border M&A’. Journal of  International Economic Law, v. 15, n. 4, 
p. 843, 863, 2012.
27  Note, SAUVANT, Karl P.; GOVITRIKAR, Vishwas P.; 
DAVIES, Ken. MNEs from Emerging Markets: New Players in the 
World FDI Market. New York: Vale Columbia Center, 2011. p. 1ff.
28  OECD. Novel Features in OECD Countries’ Recent Investment 
Agreements: An Overview. Paris: OECD, 2005. p. 4 at No. 11; VADI, 
Sara. “Fragmentation or Cohesion? Investment versus Cultural Pro-
tection Rules”. Journal of  World Investment and Values, v. 10, p. 573, 
2009.
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exist in relation to FDI. Authors speak of  at least three 
threats of  diverse kinds potentially generated by FDI: 
the dominance of  supply that penalizes the host coun-
try, the transfer of  technology that harms host country 
interests, and the possibility of  engaging in sabotage or 
espionage.29 
1) The first potential damage to national security ari-
sing out of  a foreign M&As refers to the possibility that 
the country where the acquired firm is located, becomes 
dependent on a foreign controlled supplier of  goods 
or services which are crucial to the normal functioning 
of  the host country. And this dependence can finally 
imply a delay, denial or the placement of  conditions on 
the provisions of  such goods or services by the foreign 
acquired firm.30 Nevertheless, for this threat of  depen-
dence to be credible, the industry should be tightly con-
centrated with a limited number of  close substitutes 
and high switching costs.31 And in the evaluation of  the 
competition among alternative suppliers not the local 
market but the global market must be considered.32
2) The second category of  threats refers to those 
M&As that can imply transfer of  certain technology 
or expertise to a foreign controlled entity that could be 
deployed by this entity, or its government, in a manner 
harmful to that country’s national interests.33 The asses-
29  MORAN, Theodore H., ‘Foreign Acquisitions and National 
Security: What are Genuine Threats? What Are Implausible Wor-
ries?’. In: DRABEK, Zdenek; MAVROIDIS, Petros C. (Ed.), Regula-
tion of  Foreign Investment Challenges to International Harmonization. Singa-
pore World Scientific, World Studies in International Economics. New York: 
Columbia University, 2013. v. 21. p. 372-373. Also, DOBSON, Wen-
dy. “China’s State-Owned Enterprises and Canada’s Foreign Direct 
Investment Policy”. Canadian Public Policy, v. 43, 2017. p. S28, S41; 
HANEMANN, Thilo; ROSEN, Daniel H. China Invests in Europe 
Patterns, Impacts and Policy Implications. New York: Rhodium Group, 
2012. p. 60-1.
30  MORAN, Theodore H. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Can-
ada: Threat or Opportunity?. Ottawa: Canadian Council of  Chief  
Executives/Conseil Canadien des Chiefs d’Enterprise, 2012. p. 5-6.
31  MORAN, Theodore H., ‘Foreign Acquisitions and National 
Security: What are Genuine Threats? What Are Implausible Wor-
ries?’. In: DRABEK, Zdenek; MAVROIDIS, Petros C. (Ed.), Regula-
tion of  Foreign Investment Challenges to International Harmonization. Singa-
pore World Scientific, World Studies in International Economics. New York: 
Columbia University, 2013. v. 21. p. 373.
32  MORAN, Theodore H., ‘Foreign Acquisitions and National 
Security: What are Genuine Threats? What Are Implausible Wor-
ries?’. In: DRABEK, Zdenek; MAVROIDIS, Petros C. (Ed.), Regula-
tion of  Foreign Investment Challenges to International Harmonization. Singa-
pore World Scientific, World Studies in International Economics. New York: 
Columbia University, 2013. v. 21. p. 385.
33  MORAN, Theodore H. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Can-
ada: Threat or Opportunity?. Ottawa: Canadian Council of  Chief  
sment of  this threat also depends on how broadly avai-
lable the additional production or managerial expertise 
is involved, as well as the impact of  the acquisition on 
those who seek its output.34
3) Finally, a third category of  threats are those ari-
sing out of  M&As that would allow the insertion of  
a certain capability for infiltration, surveillance or sa-
botage into the provision of  certain services or goods 
which are deemed crucial to the normal functioning of  
the economy of  the host country: telecommunications 
is one of  them.35 
In any case, taking these three different threats into 
account and leaving aside the potential political and me-
dia impact of  some of  the M&As undergone in recent 
times, it is necessary to differentiate when approaching 
particular FDI proposals between genuine threats and 
generic which in some cases may be just excuses for the 
host state to adopt hidden protectionist measures.
3.2. Factors of potential danger to be taken into 
account by host states
A double-edged attitude towards FDI is growing 
nowadays in many parts of  the world. As a matter of  
principle most states encourage FDI, but at the same 
time many of  them are increasingly beginning to adopt 
a more selective approach in relation to it. That finally 
means that FDI is welcomed as a general rule, but some 
FDI or some kinds of  FDI are not that welcome in 
certain cases or as regards particular targets. National 
security, national essential security interests or similar 
terms are some of  the grounds used to protect the host 
state from undesired FDI.
FDI legislation reflects the balance between the be-
nefits that host and home countries expect from foreign 
Executives/Conseil Canadien des Chiefs d’Enterprise, 2012. p. 6.
34  MORAN, Theodore H., ‘Foreign Acquisitions and National 
Security: What are Genuine Threats? What Are Implausible Wor-
ries?’. In: DRABEK, Zdenek; MAVROIDIS, Petros C. (Ed.), Regula-
tion of  Foreign Investment Challenges to International Harmonization. Singa-
pore World Scientific, World Studies in International Economics. New York: 
Columbia University, 2013. v. 21. p. 378.
35  MORAN, Theodore H. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Cana-
da: Threat or Opportunity?. Ottawa: Canadian Council of  Chief  Ex-
ecutives/Conseil Canadien des Chiefs d’Enterprise, 2012. p. 6. Note 
to this respect, INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMIT-
TEE. Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure 
The implications for national security (Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Sir 
Malcolm Rifkind, MP) Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minis-
ter on behalf  of  Her Majesty, Cm 862, June 2013. 11 ff.
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capital and the potential risks that FDI has for them.36 
And it is increasingly under pressure, especially in many 
western countries, which are currently re-evaluating the 
cost-benefit trade-off  of  certain types of  FDI. Con-
sequently, in certain places not all FDI is considered 
welcome but only some types of  FDI and different 
instruments and devices are used to control it. The ac-
ceptance of  FDI is not full and becomes increasingly 
qualified and made dependent on factors such as the 
sector or specific industry targeted by the investment, 
its nature –either greenfield or through M&A of  an al-
ready existing undertaking, its condition –purely private 
or sovereign driven- or its origin. 
Reference to these concepts opens the question of  
determining which foreign investment can be dange-
rous for the host state, in other words, to specify against 
“what” or against “whom” is protection sought. And 
this is done by every state on its own. Any of  these 
four factors, alone or a combination of  some of  them, 
activate in most cases the national system of  evaluation 
of  FDI on national security or related grounds. For ins-
tance, the origin of  the investment and the quality of  
the investor are relevant in order to assess its potential 
conflict with national security. But also the political and 
investment climate of  the host country is very relevant 
in the process of  evaluating the potential risk of  the 
operation in a specific moment, in a certain country 
and as regards a particular area of  the economy. FDI 
may generate different concerns when it refers to nu-
clear power energy or to solar energy, or when the in-
vestment is proposed by a Canadian corporation or a 
Russian one. Even when the investor is controlled by a 
state, different perception stems from different places 
whether a Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) or 
a Chinese one and this perception varies depending on 
the place where the investment is made too.37 
36  SAUVANT, Karl P. “Driving and Countervailing Forces: A 
Rebalancing of  National FDI Policies”. Yearbook on International In-
vestment Law & Policy, p. 233, 2008.
37  In 2007 Statoil, the Norwegian State Owned Enterprise which 
happened to be the world´s biggest one of  this kind, bought North 
American Oil Sands Corp. (NAOSC) and no special concerns were 
raised in Canada (Statoil’s $2 bln Canadian Oil Sands Deal Approved, Re-
uters (on line), 26 June 2007, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/statoil-
naosc-approval-idUKL2668735420070626> accessed 13 December 
2017). Whereas two years earlier state owned CNOOC was forced 
to drop its bid for US based oil producer UNOCAL due to national 
security concerns and alleged violation of  fair trade rules created by 
this operation (Chinese Drop Bid to Buy U.S. Oil Firm, The Washington 
Post (on line), 3 May 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080200404.html>. Ac-
3.2.1. Origin of the investment
The origin of  the FDI constitutes an essential ele-
ment in the current security related discourse towards 
foreign investment. Against whom is protection sou-
ght? The primary response to this question is: against 
certain investors who come from individual countries, 
those which are perceived as hostile or with which the 
host country has an unfriendly relationship.38 
FDI has been traditionally considered “foreign” be-
cause of  the nationality of  the investor. This principle is 
also present in the vast majority of  IIAs that choose na-
tionality as the distinctive element to determine foreig-
nness.39 Nevertheless, this rule poses some problems in 
relation to private individuals and raises many questions 
as regards corporations. The issue of  the origin of  FDI 
may be sometimes rather problematic because it is not 
always easy to actually verify its real provenance. Not 
only because of  the intrinsic difficulty in determining 
the nationality of  a firm but, also and increasingly, be-
cause of  the structure of  international trade and invest-
ments.40  
3.2.2. The nature of the investment: Sovereign-
-driven investment
Western developed economies have traditionally 
been, and are, open to FDI. However, the financial crisis 
and the appearance of  new economic actors worldwide 
have made them generate a certain degree of  preven-
tion as regards FDI or, at least, as regards some FDI; 
one coming from certain specific countries and/or di-
rected towards certain firms or areas of  the economy. 
The nature of  FDI constitutes an additional element of  
concern and potential control. Many cases of  acquisi-
tions of  existing firms by some SWFs and, mostly by, 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)41 since the beginning 
cess on: 29 Nov. 2017. 
38  Note UNCTAD. The Protection of  National Security in IIAs. 
UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Develop-
ment. New York/Geneva: UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/5, UNC-
TAD, 2009. p. 17. 
39  DIMOPOULOS, Angelos. EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford: 
OUP, 2011. p. 22; DOLZER, Rudolf; SCHREUER, Christoph. Prin-
ciples of  International Investment Law. 2. ed. Oxford: OUP, 2012. p. 32.
40  DIMOPOULOS, Angelos. EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford: 
OUP, 2011. p. 33-6. 
41  GILLIGAN, George; BOWMAN, Megan; O’BRIEN, Justin. 
The Global Impact of  State Capital, The University of  New South 
Wales School of  Law, Centre for Law, Markets and Regulation, 
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of  the financial crisis in 2007 have been published.42 
This growing role played by SWFs and SOEs in recent 
times, and the wide potential for influence over their 
objectives and activities by foreign governments directly 
or indirectly owning or controlling them, has created 
certain concerns in host states regarding the real pur-
pose of  the investment to be made: whether it is purely 
commercial or it primarily responds to some political 
and geo-strategic reasons.
The increase of  FDI, especially in the form of  
M&As coming from emergent economies, of  diffe-
rent political ideologies, geographical regions or levels 
of  development, generates doubts about the current 
internal structure and management standards of  these 
SCEs, and also as regards the implementation of  their 
activities in accordance with the basic rules of  fair com-
petition and free economy in so far as they may, for ins-
tance, have access to funding by state-owned financial 
institutions at a lower rate of  return on their invested 
capital than private investors,43 thus impairing free com-
petition in the global market.
This move comes together with a change in the pat-
tern of  its development that may also affect its future. 
M&A has now become the dominant form of  FDI and 
FDI by private equity and hedge funds, as well as SCEs, 
mainly SWFs and SOEs is gaining relevance.44 In addi-
tion to the origin, foreign investors who are owned or 
controlled by foreign states constitute an autonomous 
category of  investors that are considered as such in 
many countries irrespective of  their nationality or of  
the target of  the particular FDI project.45
CLMR Research paper series, Working Paper, n. 13-2, Sydney, July 
2013. p. 16.
42  Note JOST, Thomas. “Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Ger-
man Reaction”. In: SAUVANT, Karl P.; SACHS, Lisa E. SCHMIT 
JONGBLOED, Wouter P.F.  (Ed.). Sovereign Investment. Oxford: Con-
cerns and Policy Reactions, OUP, 2012. p. 453.
43  Note GÖKGÜR, Nilgün. “Are Resurging State-Owned En-
terprises Impeding Competition Overseas?”. In: SAUVANT, Karl 
P.; REIMER, Jennifer. (Ed.). FDI Perspectives: Issues in International 
Investment. 2. ed. New York: VCC, 2012. p. 26.
44  SAFARIAN, A. Edward, “The Canadian Policy Response to 
Sovereign Direct Investment”. In: SAUVANT, Karl P.; SACHS, Lisa 
E.; SCHMIT JONGBLOED, Wouter P. F.  (Ed.). Sovereign Investment. 
Oxford: Concerns and Policy Reactions, OUP, 2012. p. 431.
45  These actors are the consequence of  the process of  globaliza-
tion undergone by the economy as well as a reflection of  the more 
proactive “state-led investment capitalism” that characterizes the 
global economy nowadays. See, GILLIGAN, George; BOWMAN, 
Megan; O’BRIEN, Justin. The Global Impact of  State Capital, The 
University of  New South Wales School of  Law, Centre for Law, 
Markets and Regulation, CLMR Research paper series, Working Pa-
The global threat perception has increased steadily 
in the last few years and national security concerns are 
affecting the development of  international trade and of  
FDI. This becomes especially manifest as regards the 
protection of  certain strategic industries and of  some 
critical infrastructures.46 The changing origin of  FDI 
and the possibility of  certain areas of  the economy to 
be dominated by foreigners have raised national securi-
ty anxieties in many western economies as well as have 
fostered economic nationalism.47 This dissatisfaction 
increases in relation to sovereign driven FDI. 
For instance, sovereign driven foreign investment 
has constituted a hot topic for a long time in Austra-
lia. Already in 2009, the Australian Senate Economics 
References Committee launched a public enquiry on 
SOEs and afterwards issued a Report which got a res-
ponse from the Government at the end of  that year.48 
The Senate welcomed and praised works undertaken by 
certain international organisations in order to regula-
te SOEs but added that the Committee “believes that 
the best way for Australia to regulate the conduct of  
foreign investors (be they SWF, SOE or private com-
mercial operator), is through developing robust domes-
tic legislation”.49 Nevertheless, the Senate finally con-
sidered that the Australian regulatory framework was 
sufficient.50 Australia finally modified its regulation in 
2008 to include a new policy on sovereign FDI. Cur-
rently, the process of  evaluation of  FDI proposals in 
Australia is made directly dependent on the nature of  
per, Sydney n. 13-2, July 2013. p. 12.
46  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPEMENT. The Protection of  National Security in IIAs. UNC-
TAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development. 
New York/Geneva: UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/5, UNCTAD, 
2009. p. 14. 
47  MALAWER, Stuart S. “Global Mergers and National Secu-
rity”. Virginia Lawyer Magazine, p. 33-34, Dec. 2006.
48  Several parliamentary reviews of  the FDI review system have 
taken place during the last few years, noted GOLDING, Greg. “Aus-
tralia’s Experience with Foreign Direct Investment by State Con-
trolled Entities: A Move towards Xenophobia or Greater Open-
ness?” Seattle University Law Review, v. 37, p. 533-546, 2014.
49  THE SENATE, ECONOMIC REFERENCES COMMIT-
TEE. Foreign investment by state-owned entities. Canberra, September 2009. 
Available in: <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/
Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed_inquiries/2008-10/
firb_09/report/index>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018.
50  THE SENATE, ECONOMIC REFERENCES COMMIT-
TEE. Foreign investment by state-owned entities. Canberra, September 2009. 
Available in: <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/
Committees/Senate/Economics/Completed_inquiries/2008-10/
firb_09/report/index>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018.
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the foreign investor. Any investment proposal made by 
state-owned or controlled foreign corporations aimed 
at acquiring a direct interest in Australia -usually 10 per 
cent or the ability to influence, participate in or control 
it-, to initiate a new business or gaining an interest in 
Australian land are always subject to scrutiny and prior 
acceptance by the administration, regardless of  the va-
lue of  the investment.51 Other reforms in this same sen-
se have taken place around the world.52  
SWFs and SOEs are state-controlled investors with 
enormous amounts of  capital available and with a dual 
personality as public actors performing, at least in 
theory, private activities with not always clearly private 
–in the sense of  purely commercial- objectives. SOEs 
and SWFs do not constitute new realities in the eco-
nomy nor in the FDI arena.53 SWFs and SOEs have 
existed for some decades but they have gained major re-
levance in the last twenty years generating mixed attitu-
des towards them. The active role that they have played 
in the world economy has raised concerns regarding the 
nature of  their activity and their potential control of, 
and influence on, key sectors of  the economy, mostly in 
developed countries.54 It is considered that not all coun-
51  THE TREASURER. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 
Our Approach. July 1st, 2016. Available in: <https://firb.gov.au/
files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-Investment-Policy-2016-2017.
pdf>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018. 5. Additionally, some exceptions that 
apply to non-government foreign investors are not applicable to for-
eign government investors. Specific exemptions for foreign govern-
ment investors include, for instance, the acquisition of  residential 
land to be used for diplomatic purposes (Ibid, 6). Note also GOLD-
ING, Greg. “Australia’s Experience with Foreign Direct Investment 
by State Controlled Entities: A Move towards Xenophobia or Great-
er Openness?” Seattle University Law Review, v. 37, p. 552, 2014.
52  MUCHLINSKI, Peter T. Multinational Enterprises & the Law. 2. 
ed. Oxford: OUP, 2007. p. 201.
53  Resemblance to the British East India Company, the Hudson 
Bay Company or the Dutch East India United Company, found-
ed during XVII Century have been stressed. Note GILLIGAN, 
George; BOWMAN, Megan; O’BRIEN, Justin. The Global Impact 
of  State Capital, The University of  New South Wales School of  
Law, Centre for Law, Markets and Regulation, CLMR Research pa-
per series, Working Paper No. 13-2, Sydney, July 2013. p. 10.
54  Nevertheless, SWFs enjoyed a sudden upgrade in their reputa-
tion in the period between March 2007 and June 2008 when SWFs 
injected US$59 billion into western financial institutions, including 
high-profile equity purchases of  Barclays, Citigroup Inc., Credit Sui-
sse, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley or UBS. In fact, in 2007 a bunch 
of  SWFs owned by Singapore, Kuwait or South Korea, 2007 pro-
vided much of  the US$21 billion needed by Merrill Lynch and Citi-
corp to avoid bankruptcy, note DREZNER, Daniel W. “Sovereign 
Wealth Funds and the (In)security of  Global Finance”. Fall/Winter 
Journal of  International Affairs, v. 62, p. 115, 2008; PISTOR, Katha-
rina. “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Global Finance”. In: SAUVANT, 
tries share the same values and behaviour and that their 
companies may act in accordance with political or ideo-
logical ideas and not only on a purely commercial basis. 
Host countries are eager to receive FDI but they fear 
their non-commercial use and want to protect themsel-
ves against this potential use and the consequences for 
their national security or their economy arising out of  it.
Emerging economies have traditionally invested 
their surplus of  foreign exchange reserves in low-risk 
assets such as US Treasury notes.55 However the growth 
of  surpluses in certain economies during the last two 
decades has fuelled a shift of  excess reserves to higher-
-risk operations aimed to facilitate the diversification 
of  accumulated reserves and to gain a higher-return 
investment.56 SCEs are nowadays broadening their in-
vestment worldwide affecting highly sensitive industries 
and economic areas of  host states such as energy and 
mining, network technology, critical infrastructures ma-
nagement or banking and finance, in which, additio-
nally, some national champion industries of  the host 
state may be involved.57 
3.2.3. The target of the investment
In addition to the origin and/or the nature of  the 
investment, the particular sector where it is to be made 
Karl P.; SACHS, Lisa E.; SCHMIT Jongbloed, Wouter P. F. (Ed.). 
Sovereign Investment. Oxford: Concerns and Policy Reactions, OUP, 
2012. p. 145; WEISS, Martin A. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Background 
and Policy Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress, Congres-
sional Research Service, RL34336, Washington 3 September 2008. 
p. 1-2; GILSON, Ronald; MILHAUPT, Curtis. “Sovereign Wealth 
funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the 
New Merchantilism”. Standford Law Review, v. 60, p. 1345-1348, 2008. 
Nevertheless, the participation of  SWF, many from emergent coun-
tries in global financial players has existed since long.
55  GILSON, Ronald; MILHAUPT, Curtis. “Sovereign Wealth 
funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the 
New Merchantilism”. Standford Law Review, v. 60, p. 1347, 2008; 
ROSE, Paul. “Sovereigns as Shareholders”. North Carolina Law Re-
view, v. 87, p. 101-105, 2008.
56  WEISS, Martin A. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Background and Policy 
Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, RL34336, Washington 3 September 2008. p. 2; GILSON, 
Ronald; MILHAUPT, Curtis. “Sovereign Wealth funds and Cor-
porate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Merchan-
tilism”. Standford Law Review, v. 60, p. 1348, 2008. This is not a new 
reality because the same happened with Japan during the late 1980’s, 
note ROSE, Paul. “Sovereigns as Shareholders”. North Carolina Law 
Review, v. 87, p. 102, 2008.
57  GILSON, Ronald; MILHAUPT, Curtis. “Sovereign Wealth 
funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the 
New Merchantilism”. Standford Law Review, v. 60, p. 1348, 2008.
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or the specific firm targeted constitute a landmark for 
the evaluation and acceptance of  FDI proposals. For 
different reasons, the host country may wish to retain 
control over certain key areas of  its economy or to pre-
vent “flagship” companies falling under the control of  
foreigners, even if  they come from friendly countries.58 
The determination of  these specific sectors and fir-
ms underlie the increasing introduction of  screening 
systems on national security and related grounds in 
some countries of  the world. In 2005 France identified 
certain sectors where FDI would be subject to review,59 
in 2007, the US increased the number of  transactions 
subject to revision by the Committee on Foreign In-
vestment in the US (CFIUS),60 also in 2009 Canada and 
Germany introduced all-sectors national security review 
mechanisms.61 In Australia, special attention is devoted 
to foreign investment in land,62 a highly critical sector 
for Australian economy and the “nation´s psyche”.63 
58  UNCTAD. The Protection of  National Security in IIAs. UNCTAD 
Series on International Investment Policies for Development. New 
York/Geneva: UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/5, UNCTAD, 2009. p. 
18. 
59  Décret n° 2005-1739 du 30 décembre 2005 réglementant les 
relations financières avec l’étranger et portant application de l’article 
L. 151-3 du code monétaire et financier [Decree No 2005-1739 of  
30 governing foreign financial relationships and applying article L. 
151-3 of  the Monetary and Financial Code] (France) JO, 31 Decem-
ber 2005. Note also, Décret n° 2014-479 du 14 mai 2014 relatif  aux 
investissements étrangers soumis à autorisation préalable [Decree 
No 2014-479 of  14 May 2014 on foreign investment submitted to 
premiliminary registration] (France) JO, 15 May 2014 and Décret n° 
2017-932 du 10 mai 2017 portant diverses mesures de simplification 
pour les entreprises [Decree No 2017-932 of  10 May 2017 on meas-
ures of  simplification for enterprises] (France) JO, 11 May 2017.
60  Foreign Investment and National Security Act of  2007 (FIN-
SA), Pub.L. 110–49, 121 Stat. 246.
61  Respectively, Investment Canada Act (ICA) R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 
(1st Supp.), Part IV.1 and Außenwirtschaftsgesetz [Foreign Trade 
and Payments Act] (Germany) 6 June 2013, BGBl I, 1482, reformed 
by the Neunte Verordnung zur Änderung der Außenwirtschaftsver-
ordnung [Ninth Ordinance amending the AWV] (Germany) 14 July 
2017, BAnz AT 17 July 2017 V1.
62  In accordance with S. 4 of  the Foreign Acquisitions and 
Takeovers Act 1975 (‘FATA’), Act No. 92 of  1975, s 4, Australian 
land “means agricultural land, commercial land, residential land or 
a mining or production tenement”. Note THE TREASURER. Aus-
tralia’s Foreign Investment Policy Our Approach. July 1st, 2016. Available 
in: <https://firb.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-Invest-
ment-Policy-2016-2017.pdf>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018. Annex 1, 15.
63  SANYAL, Kali. Foreign investment in Australian agriculture, Parlia-
ment of  Australia. Department of  Parliamentary Services, Research 
Paper, Parliament of  Australia, Canberra 18 February 2014. 15; 
GILLIGAN, George; BOWMAN, Megan; O’BRIEN, Justin. The 
Global Impact of  State Capital, The University of  New South Wales 
School of  Law, Centre for Law, Markets and Regulation, CLMR Re-
search paper series, Working Paper No. 13-2, Sydney, July 2013. p. 
Australian land includes “agricultural and commercial land, 
mining and production tenements, and residential land”.64 In re-
lation to agricultural land65 the threshold for evaluation 
was reduced drastically in March 2015 from AUD252 
million to AUD15 million.66 But, as a general rule all fo-
reign persons acquiring vacant commercial land67 or an 
interest in residential real estate68 must obtain approval 
regardless of  its value.69 As a matter of  principle, ser-
vices tend to be more restricted than manufacturing as 
regards the acceptance of  FDI.70 In many cases services 
66. Significantly, a vast majority of  Australians are favorable to FDI 
but rising opposition exists -63 per cent in 2014- as regards foreign 
investment in agriculture, as well as in ports and airports. OLIVER, 
Alex. The Lowy Institute Poll 2014. Lowy Institute for International 
Policy. Sydney, 2014. Available in: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/
sites/default/files/2014_lowy_institute_poll_0.pdf>. Access on: 15 
Jul. 2018. 3-4 & 11.
64  In accordance to the Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 
2016 (<https://firb.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-
Investment-Policy-2016-2017.pdf> accessed 29 November 2017). 
Note, The Treasurer, above n 51, 4. 
65  In accordance to s 4 ‘FATA’, agricultural land means, “land in 
Australia that is used, or that could reasonably be used, for a primary 
production business.”
66  Note THE TREASURER. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 
Our Approach. July 1st, 2016. Available in: <https://firb.gov.au/
files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-Investment-Policy-2016-2017.
pdf>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018. p. 4, regarding the threshold for in-
vestors coming from Chile, New Zealand and the US. This move is 
in line with the large opposition -81 per cent in 2012- against the 
Australian government allowing foreign companies to buy Austral-
ian farmland to grow crops or farm livestock (and 63 per cent saying 
they are strongly against), see HANSON, Fergus. Australia and New 
Zealand in the World Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. Lowy Institute 
for International Policy. Sydney. 2012. Available in: <https://www.
lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-institute-poll-2012-public-
opinion-and-foreign-policy>. Access on: 14 Jul. 2018.
67  In accordance to s 4 ‘FATA’, this notion means “land in Aus-
tralia or the seabed of  the offshore area, other than land: (a) used 
wholly and exclusively for a primary production business; or (b) on 
which there is at least one dwelling (except commercial residential 
premises); or (c) on which the number of  dwellings (except com-
mercial residential premises) that could reasonably be built is less 
than the number prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of  
subparagraph (a)(ii) of  the definition of  residential land in this sec-
tion.”
68  In accordance to s 4 ‘FATA’, residential land “(a) means land 
in Australia if: (i) there is at least one dwelling on the land; or (ii) the 
number of  dwellings that could reasonably be built on the land is 
less than the number prescribed by the regulations; and (b) does not 
include land: (i) used wholly and exclusively for a primary produc-
tion business; or (ii) on which the only dwellings are commercial 
residential premises.” 
69  This rule is subject to international commitments acquired by 
Australia, note THE TREASURER. Australia’s Foreign Investment Pol-
icy Our Approach. July 1st, 2016. Available in: <https://firb.gov.au/
files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-Investment-Policy-2016-2017.
pdf>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018. p. 4.
70  GOLUB, Stephen S. Measures of  Restrictions on Inward Foreign Di-
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are considered strategic or sensitive for the country, the-
refore the discrimination that may exist against foreign 
ownership is not based, or at least is not only based, on 
economic or commercial reasons but also on national 
security or national essential security interests grounds 
and, in certain cases, on economic nationalism or pro-
tectionist ideas.71 
3.2.4. Thresholds
In addition to the origin or nature of  the foreign 
investment and to the target of  the investment, also 
the amount of  the investment or the future degree of  
involvement of  the foreign investor in a specific firm 
is relevant. Thresholds for invoking national security 
concerns are usual fixed in some FDI review systems 
on national security grounds. It is important to specify 
how much involvement a foreign investor must have in 
a specific firm in the host state before it is considered to 
be a risk for its national security. If  it is necessary for the 
foreign investor to fully own the firm in order to beco-
me a risk for the host state or whether it is enough when 
an effective control or just certain voting rights exist, 
and how this is actually determined. All these elements 
are for states to determine and different responses to 
them are found worldwide.72 For instance, in Australia, 
as a general rule, and in relation to non-land proposals,73 
foreign entities74 must notify, and get acceptance, before 
rect Investment for OECD Countries. Paris: OECD Economic Depart-
ment Working Papers, 2003. p. 16. (No. 357, OECD Publishing).
71  GOLUB, Stepehn S. “Opennes to Foreign Direct Investment 
in Services: An International Comparative Analysis”. The World 
Economy, p. 1245, 2009. p. 1245, 1246.
72  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPEMENT. The Protection of  National Security in IIAs. UNC-
TAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development. 
New York/Geneva: UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/5, UNCTAD, 
2009. p. 24-5.
73  This threshold is elevated to AUD1 094 million for investors 
coming from Chile, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and the US, 
when the investment is made in non-prescribed sensitive sectors. 
The usual threshold of  AUD252 million remains when the invest-
ment is made in prescribed sensitive sectors in accordance with s 26 
‘FATA’. See THE TREASURER. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 
Our Approach. July 1st, 2016. Available in: <https://firb.gov.au/
files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-Investment-Policy-2016-2017.
pdf>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018. p. 3. 
74  Note s 4 ‘FATA’ as regards the meaning of  ‘foreign person’: 
‘(a) an individual not ordinarily resident in Australia; or (b) a cor-
poration in which an individual not ordinarily resident in Australia, 
a foreign corporation or a foreign government holds a substantial 
interest; or (c) a corporation in which 2 or more persons, each of  
whom is an individual not ordinarily resident in Australia, a foreign 
acquiring a substantial interest –at least 20 per cent-75 
in, or the control of, an Australian business valued 
AUD252 million or more.76 To enter into such an ac-
quisition without giving prior notification and obtaining 
a statement of  approval by the government constitutes 
an offence.77
4. mechAnIsms to contRol fdI ex Ante on 
nAtIonAl secuRIty oR RelAted gRounds
Acquisitions of  national corporations by foreign 
investors either private or public coming on many oc-
casions from emerging markets and targeted at diffe-
rent sectors of  the economy or firms of  the host state 
has spread social alarm and regulatory reactions against 
FDI in many places of  the world, or at least against FDI 
coming from certain countries or that which is targeting 
certain areas of  the national economy. This refers to 
developing countries –the extractive industry is a good 
example of  that- but also increasingly to developed 
ones. Developed countries fear they will lose control 
of  strategic sectors of  the economy and national cham-
corporation or a foreign government, hold an aggregate substan-
tial interest; or (d) the trustee of  a trust in which an individual not 
ordinarily resident in Australia, a foreign corporation or a foreign 
government holds a substantial interest; or (e) the trustee of  a trust 
in which 2 or more persons, each of  whom is an individual not or-
dinarily resident in Australia, a foreign corporation or a foreign gov-
ernment, hold an aggregate substantial interest; or (f) a foreign gov-
ernment; or (g) any other person, or any other person that meets the 
conditions, prescribed by the regulations.’ See THE TREASURER. 
Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy Our Approach. July 1st, 2016. Avail-
able in: <https://firb.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-
Investment-Policy-2016-2017.pdf>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018. p. 3.
75  That is, in those cases when a single person has 20 per cent or 
more, or several foreign persons have 40 per cent or more, of  the is-
sued shares, issued shares if  all rights were converted, voting power, 
or potential voting power, of  a corporation. THE TREASURER. 
Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy Our Approach. July 1st, 2016. Avail-
able in: <https://firb.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-
Investment-Policy-2016-2017.pdf>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018. p. 3 & 
s 4 ‘FATA’. Regarding the way to calculate this participation, note 
Golding, above n 48, 547.
76  Some exemptions from the need to seek foreign investment 
approval are foreseen in certain circumstances, note THE TREAS-
URER. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy Our Approach. July 1st, 
2016. Available in: <https://firb.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australias-
Foreign-Investment-Policy-2016-2017.pdf>. Access on: 15 Jul. 
2018. p. 6. 
77  GOLDING, Greg. “Australia’s Experience with Foreign Di-
rect Investment by State Controlled Entities: A Move towards Xen-
ophobia or Greater Openness?” Seattle University Law Review, v. 37, 
p. 547, 2014.
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pions in favour of  foreign corporations coming in many 
cases from geopolitical or economic competitors.78  
In this scenario it is indispensable to distinguish 
between the protection of  the state and its economic 
and social viability, through the reference to terms like 
national security or essential security interests and the 
protection of  the economic interests of  the state, of  
its economic development or any other critical objec-
tive which may or may not be linked to the previous 
idea of  national security and that in certain cases may 
even run against the notion of  the free market. The line 
between protecting legitimate public policy objectives 
and protectionism is very fine and not always easy to be 
determined.79
The study of  FDI has been traditionally very much 
linked to the analysis of  IIAs, especially of  Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) and, consequently, to the 
dimension of  its protection ex post; once the specific 
investment project has already been implemented in the 
host country. Only some isolated BITs, mostly those 
entered into by the US and Canada and more recently 
Japan,80 cover both the pre-establishment and the post-
-establishment phase of  FDI.81 Habitually, the majority 
of  them, irrespective of  their bilateral and multilateral 
dimension, basically include rules referring to the tradi-
tional dimension of  the promotion and protection of  
FDI.82 
Nevertheless, this traditional ex post approach linked 
to the IIAs entered into worldwide is now combined in 
78  SAUVANT, Karl P. “Driving and Countervailing Forces: A 
Rebalancing of  National FDI Policies”. Yearbook on International In-
vestment Law & Policy, p. 240-243, 2008.
79  Additionally, the “fuzziness” of  the terms used “inevitably” 
creates the risk of  abuse for protectionist purposes. SAUVANT, 
Karl P. FDI Protectionism Is on the Rise, Policy Research Work-
ing Paper 5052, The World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Network, International Trade Department World 
Bank, Washington, September 2009. p. 14.
80  Consider, MUCHLINSKI, Peter T. “Corporations and the 
Uses of  Law: International Investment Arbitration as a “Multilateral 
Legal Order”. Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4, p. 3, 2011. p. 3-4.
81  Also the OECD Code of  Liberalization of  Capital Movements 
(OECD, Paris, 2013) and the OECD Code of  Current Invisibles 
Operations (OECD, Paris, 2013) consider the pre-establishment 
phase, note YANNACA-SMALL, Katia, Essential Security Interests 
under International Investment Law, in: OECD. International Invest-
ment Perspectives: Freedom of  Investment in a Changing World, Paris: 
OECD, 2007. p. 94.
82  Note TRAKMAN, Leon E.; RANIERI, Nicola W. “Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Historical Perspective”. In: TRAKMAN, 
Leon E.; RANIERI, Nicola W. (Ed.). Regionalism in International In-
vestment Law. Oxford: OUP, 2013. p. 19.
many states with an increased focus on the phase pre-
vious to the actual implementation of  the investment in 
the host country. The goal to balance the commitment 
towards the free circulation of  FDI with the preserva-
tion of  certain areas of  the national economy and fir-
ms from control by foreign investors has not -always or 
only- given place to broader areas where access of  FDI 
is not allowed, but to the establishment of  mechanisms 
aimed to control ex ante foreign investment in certain 
fields or coming from certain countries on national se-
curity or national interests’ bases.83 Some countries have 
now introduced changes in their legislations on FDI. 
And some of  these changes relate to the introduction 
of  control systems on the entry of  FDI into their eco-
nomies.84 The final consequence is that the state is gran-
ted the power to regulate and to stop some FDI pro-
posals, at least those that, according to it, pose national 
security concerns.85 
Despite the generally positive attitude maintained as 
regards FDI flows a truly “open door policy” towards 
foreign investment does not seem to exist, or to have 
ever existed, anywhere. No country accepts foreign 
capital, irrespective of  its origin, to enter its economy 
with total freedom and to be freely invested in any area 
of  the country.86 In fact when UNCTAD analysed the 
legislative changes on FDI implemented between 1990 
and 2009 it stressed the incidence of  the promotion and 
liberalization of  FDI during this period: between 1992 
and 2009 UNCTAD reported 2 748 legislative changes 
worldwide with 89 per cent favouring FDI.87 However, 
83  This has fostered for instance the establishment of  screening 
systems of  FDI projects on national security or related grounds in 
many countries of  the world. See, SAUVANT, Karl P. “Is the United 
States Ready for FDI from China? Overview”. In: SAUVANT, Karl 
P.  (Ed.). Investing in the United States Is the US Ready for FDI from China, 
Studies in International Investment. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham/North-
ampton, 2009. p. 10.
84  As well as, significantly, to the promotion and incentives of  
FDI, note SUMNER, Andrew. “Foreign Direct Investment in De-
veloping Countries: Have We Reached a Policy ‘Tipping Point’?”. 
Third World Quarterly, v. 29, n. 2, p. 239-242, 2008.
85  VANDUZER, J. Anthony; SIMONS, Penelope; MAYEDA, 
Graham. Integrating Sustainable Development into International Investment 
Agreements: A Guide for Developing Countries (prepared for the 
Commonwealth Secretariat by the authors, London, 2012. p. 39-224; 
UNCTAD. Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, Doc. 
Geneva: UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2015/5, UNCTAD, 2015. p. 8.
86  SALACUSE, Jeswald W. The Three Laws of  International Invest-
ment. National, Contractual and International Frameworks for For-
eign Capital. Oxford: OUP, 2013. p. 87.
87  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPEMENT. World Investment Report 2010. Investing in a 
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and despite the maintenance of  this global trend in fa-
vour of  the liberalization of  FDI, many of  these natio-
nal regulations that include provisions aimed to enhance 
the entrance of  FDI and which usually grant investors 
many benefits and guarantees, now increasingly vest at 
the same time in host states the possibility to control 
FDI and to prevent it from entering their economy or 
some firms on certain different grounds. 
Most states have retained the power to control and 
prevent international M&As under national law and, in 
many cases, also in accordance with international agree-
ments entered into by them. Limits to FDI in certain 
specific sectors like the military or infrastructures or 
general references to national security or public poli-
cy are introduced into their regulations in different 
ways.88 In some cases the final consequence is that the 
investment policy of  the country and its investment 
law are becoming increasingly considered and treated 
as an additional tool to foster national security policies 
amid an increasingly securitized world.89 In fact, the 
OECD already stated in 2006 that “(I)ssues of  security 
and other strategic concerns have moved to the fore-
front of  domestic and international investment policy 
making”,90 and recently warned of  the rise of  “hidden 
protectionism” and protectionism abuse based, among 
other factors, on national security and related grounds.91 
No specific rules controlling the entrance of  foreign 
investment on national security, national essential se-
curity interests and related grounds existed for a long 
time in many countries.92 But this has changed in the 
last few decades and now more and more specific rules 
on FDI govern this issue in many countries. States are 
Low-Carbon Economy. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 
2010. p. 76-7.
88  CHAISSE, Julien; CHAKBABORTY, Debashis; MUKHER-
JEE, Jaydeep, “Emerging Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Making: 
Assessing the Economic Feasibility and Regulatory Strategies”. Jour-
nal of  World Trade, v. 45, n. 4, p. 837-854, 2011.
89  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Protection of  “Critical Infrastructure” and 
the Role of  Investment Policies Relating to National Security. Paris: OECD, 
2008. p. 9.
90  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. International Investment Perspectives. Paris: 
OECD, 2006. p. 32.
91  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Roundtable on Freedom of  Investment 20 (19 
March 2014) Summary of  Roundtable discussions by the OECD Secretariat. 
Paris: OECD, 2014. p. 9.
92  SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The International Law on 
Foreign Investment. 3. ed. Cambridge: CUP, 2010, p. 97.
nowadays fully concerned about the problems that FDI 
may cause to them in some cases and special relevance 
is being given to sovereign FDI. Even countries that are 
investing abroad are progressively aware of  the national 
security aspects of  FDI. Governments are increasingly 
eager to screen, and in some cases even restrict, condi-
tion or block foreign investment implemented through 
takeovers of  already existing domestic corporations on 
grounds of  national security or related grounds. FDI is 
still wanted and encouraged as a general rule, and poli-
cies in favour of  attracting FDI are implemented almost 
worldwide. But this fact does not supersede the increa-
sing desire of  many states to preserve certain areas of  
their economies or firms from foreign control or, in a 
less invasive way, to control certain FDI of  a particular 
nature –basically sovereign driven FDI-, coming from 
certain countries or targeting particular firms or sectors 
of  the national economy. 
According to the World Bank’s Survey Investing 
Across Borders in 2010, a fifth of  the 87 countries 
analysed require foreign companies to go through a fo-
reign investment approval process before proceeding 
with investment in certain areas of  their economy. And 
almost 90 per cent limit foreign companies’ ability to 
participate in some specific sectors of  their economies, 
with stricter limits to their participation in services.93 
Different measures may be adopted by the host state 
to protect itself  –ex ante- from foreign investment on 
national security or similar grounds.94 
4.1. Market access measures
Prohibiting, fully or partially, foreign investment in 
particularly sensitive sectors is the most obvious ex ante 
restriction to FDI. National governments may foresee 
exclusive national ownership in certain sectors that are 
considered strategic on different grounds and therefore 
ban FDI in several areas of  the economy.95 
93  INVESTMENT CLIMATE ADVISORY SERVICES 
WORLD BANK GROUP. Investing Across Borders 2010. Indicators 
of  foreign direct investment regulation in 87 economies. Washing-
ton: World Bank, 2010. p. 8. 
94  For instance, imposition of  other emergency measures, forced 
disinvestment, denial of  benefits based on the existence of  a clause 
in the agreement, see UNCTAD. The Protection of  National Security in 
IIAs. New York/Geneva: UNCTAD Series on International Invest-
ment Policies for Development, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2008/5, 
2009. p. 30-3.
95  See POLLAN, Thomas. Legal Framework for the Admission of  
FDI. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2006. p. 58-61.
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The state has the right to protect its “essential se-
curity interests”,96 and practice shows that the “most 
heavily restricted sectors” are those considered “highly 
sensitive to national security or national sovereignty 
considerations”.97 However, a total ban of  FDI is al-
most unrealistic nowadays. Habitually, the prohibition 
refers to certain specific areas of  the economy or in-
dustries and affects both developed and developing 
countries.98 In fact, this limited prohibition constitutes 
a rather habitual measure usually drafted “in grandiose, 
but vague terms”.99 
Full  or  partial  foreign  ownership  restrictions 
usually exist  in  the  defence  industry  (both produc-
tion of  weapons and war materials); air and maritime 
cabotage services and air traffic control or the purcha-
se of  real estate by foreigners in border areas or near 
other sensitive sites.100 Border restrictions, for instance, 
constitute the most obvious example of  limitation of  
ownership which has existed for a long time in many 
countries of  the world. Foreigners are prevented –or 
face limitations- from owing real estate near territorial 
borders or in areas of  strategic significance. Additio-
nally restrictions may also concern electricity power gri-
ds and exchanges, seaport or airport management, or oil 
and gas extraction activities.101 However, these potential 
restrictions may have different degrees.
The reservation of  certain specific sectors from FDI 
has been used by developing countries to protect some 
indigenous industries from foreign control, on the basis 
of  arguments like the ‘infant industry’ and ‘crowding 
96  JACKSON, James K. Foreign Investment and National Security: 
Economic Considerations, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, 
RL34561, Washington, 4 April 2013. p. 6.
97  GOLUB, Stephen S. Measures of  Restrictions on Inward Foreign Di-
rect Investment for OECD Countries. Paris: OECD Economic Depart-
ment Working Papers, 2003. p. 24). (No. 357, OECD Publishing). 
98  KURTZ, Jürgen. “A General Investment Agreement in the 
WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 of  NAFTA and the OECD Mul-
tilateral Agreement on Investment”. University of  Pennsylvania Journal 
of  International Economic Law, v. 243, n. 3, p. 713, 2002.
99  SALACUSE, Jeswald W. The Three Laws of  International Invest-
ment. National, Contractual and International Frameworks for For-
eign Capital. Oxford: OUP, 2013. p. 94. See also, MUCHLINSKI, 
Peter T. Multinational Enterprises & the Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: OUP, 
2007. p. 179-180.
100  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT. World Investment Report 2016. Investor Nationality: 
Policy Challenges. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2016. 
p. 97-8.
101  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE DE-
VELOPMENT. World Investment Report 2016. Investor Nationality: Pol-
icy Challenges. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2016. p. 98.
out’.102 Nevertheless, also developed countries include 
these sorts of  restrictions in certain key network sec-
tors such as energy and transport. The OECD, in 2008, 
considered transport to be the sector with the highest 
number of  discriminatory measures.103 The different 
discriminatory measures adopted by the several mem-
bers of  the OECD, their broadness and specific targets, 
render a final map with many differences among coun-
tries as regards the admission of  FDI in sectors of  the 
economy and infrastructures considered critical.104 The-
se differences increase further when the FDI proposal 
is made by corporations controlled or owned by foreign 
countries. The sectoral pattern of  restrictions tends to 
be rather similar in both advanced and emerging eco-
nomies. However, the degree of  restrictiveness is gene-
rally higher in the latter group of  countries.105 In some 
cases no explicit rule exists and a more subtle position 
is maintained.106 
In addition to this ban, either total or sectoral, of  
foreign ownership in certain areas of  the economy, also 
the number of  foreign investors admitted into a cer-
tain sector of  the economy can be limited by certain 
states.107
4.2. Maintenance of state’s monopolies
Another way of  preserving some strategic sectors 
of  the economy from foreign investment is through the 
102  MUCHLINSKI, Peter T. Multinational Enterprises & the Law. 
2. ed. Oxford: OUP, 2007. p. 183-4.
103  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Protection of  “Critical Infrastructure” and 
the Role of  Investment Policies Relating to National Security. Paris: OECD, 
2008. p. 7.
104  A comparative table may be found at OECD. Protection of  
“Critical Infrastructure” and the Role of  Investment Policies Relating to Na-
tional Security. Paris: OECD, 2008. p. 10-1.
105  THOMSEN, Stephen; MISTURA, Fernando. Is investment 
protectionism on the rise? Evidence from the OECD FDI Regulatory Re-
strictiveness Index OECD Global Forum on International Investment. Paris: 
OECD, 2017. p. 6.
106  In Canada, for instance, the health care sector is considered 
to be de facto closed to FDI because private hospitals and clinics 
may not receive payments from provincial health insurance funds, 
which are deemed critical for the financial viability of  operators 
in the sector. Vid. INVESTMENT CLIMATE ADVISORY SER-
VICES WORLD BANK GROUP. Investing Across Borders 2010. In-
dicators of  foreign direct investment regulation in 87 economies. 
Washington: World Bank, 2010. p. 98.
107  KURTZ, Jürgen. “A General Investment Agreement in the 
WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 of  NAFTA and the OECD Mul-
tilateral Agreement on Investment”. University of  Pennsylvania Journal 
of  International Economic Law, v. 243, n. 3, p. 725, 2002.
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maintenance of  state monopolies in particularly sen-
sitive sectors usually linked to the provision of  basic 
public services and communications in a certain state; 
railway transport and infrastructure maintenance, lan-
dline telecommunications, oil and gas transportation, or 
electricity and water transmission are usual examples of  
them.108
4.3. Equity limitation
In addition to the previous measures some countries 
have also introduced the requirement of  joint ventures 
or equity restrictions in certain areas of  their economy. 
In fact, it is said to be one of  the most common forms 
of  discrimination against foreign investors, although 
their effectivity is, once again, under question.109
The amount and final transcendence of  the FDI 
implemented in the host state can be controlled in or-
der to ensure local control of  the sector or firm affec-
ted. For example, national governments can limit the 
share of  companies’ equity capital in a specific sector 
that non-residents are allowed to own,110 limit FDI to 
a certain level of  voting control in an enterprise in a 
specific given sector or impose the involvement of  local 
participants, irrespective of  their public or private con-
dition, in the FDI project.111 For instance, the Open Air 
Agreement between the EU and USA of  2007 explicitly 
limits the possibility of  foreign ownership, even by an 
EU citizen or corporation, of  US airlines to no more 
than 25 per cent of  the corporation´s voting equity.112 
108  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT. World Investment Report 2016. Investor Nationality: 
Policy Challenges. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2016. 
p. 98.
109  THOMSEN, Stephen; MISTURA, Fernando. Is investment 
protectionism on the rise? Evidence from the OECD FDI Regulatory Re-
strictiveness Index OECD Global Forum on International Investment. Paris: 
OECD, 2017. p. 4. 
110  GOLUB, Stephen S. Measures of  Restrictions on Inward 
Foreign Direct Investment for OECD Countries, OECD. Economic 
Department Working Papers, No. 357. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2003. 
p. 7; MUCHLINSKI, Peter T. Multinational Enterprises & the Law. 2. 
ed. Oxford: OUP, 2007. p. 184-191.
111  MUCHLINSKI, Peter T. Multinational Enterprises & the Law. 
2. ed. Oxford: OUP, 2007. p. 192-201.
112  REFERENCE “ANNEX 4: Concerning Additional Matters 
Related to Ownership, Investment and Control. Article 1: Ownership of  
Airlines of  a Party. 1. Ownership by nationals of  a Member State 
or States of  the equity of  a U.S. airline shall be permitted, subject 
to two limitations. First, ownership by all foreign nationals of  more 
than 25 percent of  a corporation’s voting equity is prohibited. Sec-
ond, actual control of  a U.S. airline by foreign nationals is also pro-
Similar limitations in other areas of  the economy like 
banking, natural resources and energy,113 nuclear energy 
and mining and mineral leases or telecommunications 
exist in many countries of  the world.114 
In some countries the possibility of  golden shares to 
prevent the acquisition of  local firms, usually privatized 
firms, by unwanted foreign investors also exists.115 This 
is a possibility that, for instance, exists in the UK whe-
re golden shares exist in certain enterprises. Hence, the 
British Government has golden shares in BAE Systems, 
Rolls-Royce or National Air Traffic Services. In fact, the 
government has exercised its golden share rights to pre-
vent unwanted takeovers in some cases.
hibited. …”. Note also, United States Government Accountability 
Office, Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, U.S. Senate, Sovereign Wealth Funds. Laws Limiting Foreign 
Investment Affect Certain U.S. Assets and Agencies Have Various 
Enforcement Processes, GAO-09-608 (Washington DC, 05.2009), 
p. 15 and Appendix II.
113  Note GRAHAM, Edward M.; MARCHICK, David M. U.S. 
National Security and Foreign Direct Investment Institute for International 
Economics. Washington, 2006. p. 13-4.
114  In the case of  Canada statutory ownership restrictions exist 
as regards certain sectors of  the economy. Basically in the trans-
portation sector -domestic and international air transportation 
sectors, foreign participation is limited to a maximum share of  49 
per cent- and telecommunications -total direct and indirect foreign 
ownership in the telecommunications sector (fixed-line and mobile/
wireless infrastructure and services) and in the television broadcast-
ing sectors is limited to 46‐ per cent-. INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
ADVISORY SERVICES WORLD BANK GROUP. Investing Across 
Borders 2010. Indicators of  foreign direct investment regulation in 
87 economies. Washington: World Bank, 2010. p. 98. Regarding the 
origins of  this limitation, GRAHAM, Edward M.; MARCHICK, 
David M. U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct Investment Institute 
for International Economics. Washington, 2006. p. 11-3. In the US no 
Federal Laws completely prohibit foreign investment in a specific 
sector. On the contrary they limit and place additional requirements 
in certain particular sectors as regards foreign investors, like nuclear 
energy or airline industries (United States Government Account-
ability Office, Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Sovereign Wealth Funds. Laws Limiting 
Foreign Investment Affect Certain U.S. Assets and Agencies Have 
Various Enforcement Processes, GAO-09-608 (Washington DC, 
05.2009), p. 14; CHALAMISH, Efraim. “Global Investment Regu-
lation and Sovereign Funds”. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, v. 13, n. 2, 
p. 645-651, 2012.
115  See POLLAN, Thomas. Legal Framework for the Admission 
of  FDI. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2006. p. 61-2; 
HEINEMANN, Andreas. “Government Control of  Cross-Border 
M&A: Legitimate Regulation or Protectionism? Control of  Cross-
Border M&A”. Journal of  International Economic Law, v. 15, n. 4, p. 
852, 2012.
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4.4. Screening systems of evaluation on 
national security grounds
Screening mechanisms of  FDI on national security, 
national essential interests or related grounds are the ri-
sing star in this area. Screening and notification proce-
dures constitute mechanisms to control the flux of  FDI 
that are becoming very popular nowadays around the 
world. Many countries, both developing and developed 
states, are aware of  the need to protect some industries 
and areas of  their economy from certain FDI or FDI 
coming from certain countries and are progressively re-
ferring to this kind of  device.116 And states are increa-
singly designing this kind of  instruments which provide 
the host state administration with the ability to evaluate 
FDI proposals and decide upon their acceptability or 
rejection.
These mechanisms are based either on the nature of  
the specific sector where the FDI project is envisaged, 
on the existence of  a certain threshold or on the nature 
of  the investor, among other potential grounds. States 
are certainly sovereign to control FDI flows in an abso-
lute manner. However, authors cast some doubts as re-
gards the all-embracing scope of  this power and subject 
the validity of  these potential measures to the fact that 
they are adopted on rational grounds.117 A case-by-case 
evaluation of  proposed FDI projects by the govern-
ment of  the host country or by a specialized –and, in 
some cases, independent- body is undertaken with the 
goal of  establishing whether the project is in accordan-
ce with the very basic economic or social policies of  the 
host state or runs against its national security.
As a matter of  principle, the development of  a 
116  As regards developing and emerging countries, note MUCH-
LINSKI, Peter T. Multinational Enterprises & the Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: 
OUP, 2007. p. 202-205; MUCHLINSKI, Peter T. “Corporations and 
the Uses of  Law: International Investment Arbitration as a “Multi-
lateral Legal Order”. Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4, p. 51, 2011.
117  The screening of  foreign investments and the subsequent 
eventual prohibition on grounds of, for instance, not being ben-
eficial to the economy of  the host state would constitute a rational 
economic ground and therefore not considered to be wrongful. This 
rationality would also be admitted in those cases in which the dis-
crimination is based on national security grounds, see SORNARA-
JAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The International Law on Foreign Investment. 
3. ed. Cambridge: CUP, 2010. p. 137.
screening system does not in many cases hamper the 
openness of  the country that designs it towards FDI. 
At least most developed countries and many emerging 
economies are clearly aligned with the free movement 
of  FDI. Nevertheless, as practice shows, these kinds of  
systems have also in many cases the tangential effect of  
dissuading potential FDI projects that are abandoned 
by their promotors after some concerns are expressed 
by public authorities.118  
4.5. Compulsory registration and check and 
balance mechanisms
In addition to the previous systems and not always 
fully independent of  them, the host government can 
also subject the acceptance of  the proposal to the mee-
ting of  certain specific conditions for its future imple-
mentation. These conditions can be independent of  
the existence of  a screening systems or be included in a 
prospective conditionality agreement reached as a con-
sequence of  the evaluation of  the FDI project on natio-
nal security or related grounds. 
Through these mechanisms, host states may try to 
maximise the benefits of  FDI or to control FDI flows 
by imposing on the investor some performance requi-
rements, although their effectiveness is still a controver-
sial issue.119 Specific measures can be very different and 
vary from country to country. 
1) States may subject the acceptance of  the pros-
pective FDI operation with a previous disclosure of  
the characteristics and nature of  the FDI project to be 
implemented to a specific government agency. In the 
US, for instance, foreign investors in agricultural land 
upon purchase of  more than 10 acres of  agricultural 
land must file a disclosure report to the Department of  
Agriculture.120 Also in Australia, under the Register of  
118  HEINEMANN, Andreas. “Government Control of  Cross-
Border M&A: Legitimate Regulation or Protectionism? Control of  
Cross-Border M&A”. Journal of  International Economic Law, v. 15, n. 
4, p. 851, 2012.
119  LONG, Guoquiang. “China’s policies on FDI: review and 
evaluation”. In: MORAN, Theodore H.; GRAHAM, Edward M.; 
BLOMSTRÖM, Magnus. (Ed.). Does foreign direct investment promote de-
velopment? Washington: (Institute for International Economics, 2005. 
p. 315.
120  United States Government Accountability Office, Report to 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Sen-
ate, Sovereign Wealth Funds. Laws Limiting Foreign Investment Af-
fect Certain U.S. Assets and Agencies Have Various Enforcement 
Processes, GAO-09-608 (Washington DC, 05.2009), p. 16, 25 and 
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Foreign Ownership of  Agricultural Land Act 2015, fo-
reign persons (including foreign government investors) 
holding interests in agricultural land must also register 
those interests with the Australian Taxation Office, re-
gardless of  the value of  that land. New interests need to 
be registered within 30 days.121
2) States can also subject FDI proposals to the im-
position of  certain conditions as regards local collabo-
ration, capitalisation requirements, export targets, local 
equity or its direction and management: presence and/
or number of  nationals or residents in the board of  di-
rectors, employment of  nationals and so on.122 National 
legislations tend to include some check and balance me-
chanisms aimed to mitigate any potential misconduct by 
the foreign investor once the investment –performed 
either by a purely private or a state driven investor- has 
been implemented.123 
Thus, certain countries may permit equity invest-
ment with no limits as a general rule while restricting 
future activities to be undertaken by the enterprise in 
a certain sector. Again in the US these restrictions ap-
ply in the sectors of  banking,124 as well as in relation to 
defence and aviation and maritime transportation and 
they are usually drafted on security considerations.125 
For instance, in the US defence sector, non US citizens 
and companies under foreign ownership, control, or in-
fluence are generally not eligible for access to classified 
information. Whereas in the transportation sector, for 
instance, vessels that are more than 25 per cent foreign 
owned cannot carry cargo or passengers between US 
Ports. The same limitation applies to aircrafts that are 
more than 25 per cent foreign owned and that are pro-
Appendix II.
121  THE TREASURER. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 
Our Approach. July 1st, 2016. Available in: <https://firb.gov.au/
files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-Investment-Policy-2016-2017.
pdf>. Access on: 15 Jul. 2018.
122  GOLUB, Stephen S. Measures of  Restrictions on Inward 
Foreign Direct Investment for OECD Countries, OECD. Economic 
Department Working Papers, No. 357. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2003. 
p. 8; SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The International Law on 
Foreign Investment. 3. ed. Cambridge: CUP, 2010 p. 92-115. 
123  CHALAMISH, Efraim. “Global Investment Regulation and 
Sovereign Funds”. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, v. 13, n. 2, p. 653, 2012.
124  Which goes back to 1869. See GRAHAM, Edward M.; MAR-
CHICK, David M. U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct Investment 
(Institute for International Economics. Washington, 2006. p. 14.
125  Most of  them go back to World War I, note GRAHAM, 
Edward M.; MARCHICK, David M. U.S. National Security and Foreign 
Direct Investment (Institute for International Economics. Washington, 2006. 
p. 13ff.
hibited to transport passengers or cargo between two 
US cities.126 Airlines are considered strategic assets with 
a potential national security dimension.127
Whether these measures are adopted to preserve 
some sectors of  relevant national interests from fo-
reign control in general or from certain investors co-
ming from particular countries or with the hidden goal 
of  safeguarding particular areas of  the economy from 
competition is something to be determined on case by 
case bases. However, and generally speaking, all those 
countries endorsing these kinds of  measures on securi-
ty related grounds share the challenge of  ensuring that 
these security-related objectives are duly achieved at the 
same time that unnecessarily restrictive measures are 
not endorsed.128 
5. scReenIng systems on nAtIonAl secuRIty, 
nAtIonAl essentIAl secuRIty InteRests oR 
RelAted gRounds And theIR foundAtIons
Rules on market access or ownership limitation cer-
tainly remain in some countries, and mechanisms to 
control the future activity and functioning of  foreign 
acquired national firms are also designed in some places. 
But, as stated, the very novelty nowadays is the growing 
development of  screening systems of  FDI on national 
security or related grounds by developed and emerging 
countries which, as a matter of  principle and due to 
their limited scope, do not limit the full support of  
many of  these countries to the idea of  free movement 
of  investment. National states may impose conditions 
on the entrance of  aliens and they can also impose con-
ditions on the entrance of  FDI.129 All these screening 
126  United States Government Accountability Office, Report to 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Sen-
ate, Sovereign Wealth Funds. Laws Limiting Foreign Investment Af-
fect Certain U.S. Assets and Agencies Have Various Enforcement 
Processes, GAO-09-608 (Washington DC, 05.2009), p. 16 and Ap-
pendix II. Consider, 49 USC § 40102(a)(15)(C).
127  See MAMOUNAS, Joseph, “Controlling Foreign Ownership 
of  U.S. Strategic Assets: The Challenge of  Maintaining National Se-
curity in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World”. Law and Business 
Review of  the Americas, v. 13, p. 381-395, 2007.
128  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Building Trust and Confidence in Interna-
tional Investment. Report by countries participating in the “Freedom 
of  Investment” Process March 2009. Paris: OECD, 2009. p. 10.
129  SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The International 
Law on Foreign Investment. 3. ed. Cambridge: CUP, 2010. p. 105. 
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systems stand on different grounds but share the same 
idea of  providing the state with a tool to protect certain 
industries or areas of  the economy from FDI that ei-
ther because its nature or origin can potentially generate 
threats to the national security of  the host state. 
Screening systems are usually mechanisms with a ra-
ther limited scope: the control of  those particular FDI 
proposals that can threaten the national security of  a 
specific host country. Because of  their own nature they 
do not target all FDI and they habitually do not put un-
der question the validity of  the premise in favour of  the 
free movement of  FDI. They only refer to some speci-
fic FDI projects that encompass certain traits and that 
therefore are subject to evaluation on national securi-
ty grounds by the public authorities of  the host state. 
Which traits those are varies from country to country as 
does the philosophy on which the evaluation is under-
taken and its results do too. 
Screening mechanisms of  evaluation of  FDI on 
national security grounds are becoming rather popular 
worldwide. And their popularity poses certain issues as 
regards the principles and grounds on which they must 
be drafted for them to be compatible with the freedom 
of  movement of  capital and investment. Thus, the 
OECD identifies four key principles to be taken into 
account in relation to the development of  any evalua-
tion system of  FDI on grounds of  safeguard of  natio-
nal security interests, public order or related notions: 
non-discrimination,130 transparency and predictability 
of  the system developed,131 proportionality,132 and ac-
countability.133 
These pre-entry requisites are drafted in very many different ways 
and in any case will be subject to the network of  treaties binding the 
host country in which the evaluation is undertaken. As a matter of  
principle and from a purely unilateral approach the evaluation by the 
competent agency or branch of  the administration of  the govern-
ment of  the host State should be made with the goal of  ascertaining 
whether the FDI projected “brings tangible benefits” to it. 
130  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Recommendation of  the Council on Guide-
lines for Recipient Country Investment Policies relating to National Security 
C(2009)63. Paris: OECD, 2009. Annex 1.
131  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Accountability for Security-Related Invest-
ment Policies. Paris: OECD, 2008. p. 4.
132  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Recommendation of  the Council on Guide-
lines for Recipient Country Investment Policies relating to National Security 
C(2009)63. Paris: OECD, 2009. Annex 3.
133  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Accountability for Security-Related Investment 
Policies. Paris: OECD, 2008. p. 4. Four additional principles are men-
Following the path of  the US, with CFIUS, and des-
pite the fear of  international retaliation that the creation 
of  this Committee implied,134 other countries have now 
replicated this move and are increasingly introducing 
clearance mechanisms to control FDI on a national 
security basis: in Australia the review is performed by 
the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), in other 
countries like Canada, France or Germany this evalua-
tion is undertaken by the Government through a spe-
cific Ministry. The approval of  the FDI proposal will 
either come through an administrative act or by way of  
a contract or agreement between the host government 
administration and the foreign investor.135 
The final relevance of  the screening system desig-
ned by a particular country will depend on the grounds 
and goals on which the system stands and on the flexi-
bility of  its application. Usually, either specific indus-
tries or all sectors of  the economy in relation, habitually, 
to FDI projects over certain thresholds are subject to 
review by an entitled authority.136 But many possibilities 
and combinations exist and the revision, like in the US, 
may also be done simple on grounds of  national securi-
tioned by the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of  Foreign 
Direct Investment: 1) Firstly, that the burden of  proof  should fall 
on those calling for restricting access to national markets and not the 
other way round; that is, on the host state. 2) Secondly, that SWFs –
as well as SOEs- do not constitute a homogeneous category and that 
these kinds of  actors may vary deeply in major issues like size, fund-
ing, objectives, investment styles or sophistication. 3) Thirdly, that 
instead of  stigmatizing the whole category of  SWFs –and SOEs- by 
referring globally to all of  them as negative FDI actors and subject-
ing all their FDI proposals to controls, only those SCEs that actu-
ally misbehave should be subject to control and evaluation. And, 
4) Fourthly, in addition to all these requirements the World Bank 
recognizes the right of  every state to draft legislation to govern the 
admission of  FDI and the possibility of  drafting a restricted list of  
investments. WORLD BANK. Guidelines on the Treatment of  Foreign 
Direct Investment. No. II(3). Available in: <https://www.italaw.com/
documents/WorldBank.pdf>. Access on: 15 July 2018.
134  CONNELL, Paul; HUANG, Tian. “An Empirical Analysis 
of  CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment Regulation in the United 
States”. The Yale Journal of  International Law, v. 39, p. 131-150, 2014; 
CARROLL, James F. F., “Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act’s Conception of  National Se-
curity”. Emory International Law Review, v. 23, p. 167-197, 2009.
135  SALACUSE, Jeswald W. The Three Laws of  International Invest-
ment. National, Contractual and International Frameworks for For-
eign Capital. Oxford: OUP, 2013. p. 109.
136  CLODFELTER, Mark A.; GUERRERO, Francesca M. S. « 
National Security and Foreign Government Ownership Restrictions 
on Foreign Investment: Predictability for Investors at the National 
Level ». In: SAUVANT, Karl P.; SACHS, Lisa E.; SCHMIT Jong-
bloed, Wouter P. F.  (Ed.). Sovereign Investment. Oxford: Concerns and 
Policy Reactions, OUP, 2012. p. 175-7.
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ty implications of  the FDI proposal without taking into 
account the final amount of  the investment foreseen 
or the sector of  the economy targeted. Or combine 
thresholds and other requirements like the need for the 
FDI proposals to render “net benefit to Canada” in the 
case of  FDI targeting this country.137 The case of  Japan, 
for instance, is significant of  this trend. Article 27(3)(i)
(a) & (b) of  the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Act allows the Minister of  Finance to screen any FDI 
that may potentially impair “national security”, disturb the 
maintenance of  “public order”, hinder the protection of  
“public safety” or have an adverse effect on the “smooth 
management of  the Japanese economy”. None of  these very 
broad and vague terms are defined and a large amount 
of  discretion is granted to the government to evaluate 
the acceptance or not of  the FDI project. It is finally for 
it to balance its positive stance towards FDI and its de-
sire to have enough flexibility to stop non-desired FDI.
Also Australia has developed a system of  case by 
case evaluation of  foreign investment proposals to ac-
quire a “substantial interest”138 or a “controlling” interest in 
an Australian corporation above a certain size or value, 
or an interest in Australia “urban land”.139 The system 
stands on the acceptance of  the freedom of  FDI in 
Australia with the limitations set forth by the existing 
regulation.140 Foreign investment is generally welcomed 
137  CLODFELTER, Mark A.; GUERRERO, Francesca M. S. « 
National Security and Foreign Government Ownership Restrictions 
on Foreign Investment: Predictability for Investors at the National 
Level ». In: SAUVANT, Karl P.; SACHS, Lisa E.; SCHMIT Jong-
bloed, Wouter P. F.  (Ed.). Sovereign Investment. Oxford: Concerns and 
Policy Reactions, OUP, 2012. p. 178-9.
138  s 9 ‘FATA’. That means the acquisition of  an interest of  15 
per cent or more in an Australian business or corporation. Note 
BATH, Vivienne. “Foreign Investment, the National Interest and 
National Security – Foreign Direct Investment in Australia and Chi-
na”. Sydney Law Review, v. 5, n. 34, p. -7, 2012; BOWMAN, Megan; 
GILLIGAN, George; O’BRIEN, Justin. “Foreign Investment Law 
and Policy in Australia: A Critical Analysis”. Law and Financial Markets 
Review, v. 8, n. 1, p. 65-66, 2014; AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. 
Foreign Investment Review Board, Foreign Investment Review Board. Annual 
Report 13/14, Commonwealth of  Australia, Canberra, 2015. p. 54.
139  See 5 ‘FATA’. Any land in Australia that is not devoted to pri-
mary production, note BOWMAN, Megan; GILLIGAN, George; 
O’BRIEN, Justin. “Foreign Investment Law and Policy in Australia: 
A Critical Analysis”. Law and Financial Markets Review, v. 8, n. 1, p. 
66, 2014.
140  FDI is welcomed but at the same time the State has the 
right and the duty to “impose conditions and rules on how differ-
ent stakeholders within its borders interact KALFADELLIS, Paul; 
GRAY, Judy; FREEMAN, Susan. The ‘National Interest’ and the Screen-
ing of  Foreign Direct Investment in Australia, Monash University Business 
and Economics. Melbourne: Working Paper 14/06, 2006. p. 8.
in Australia, traditionally “a capital hungry country”.141 
But at the same time it is said that the “community must 
have confidence that this investment is coming in on 
our terms and for our nation’s benefit.”142 The goal of  
the system is to determine whether the investment may 
run contrary to the “national interest” of  Australia; those 
FDI proposals that are contrary to the “national interest” 
of  the country are disallowed. What “national interest” 
actually means is not defined and a case-by-case evalua-
tion is requested.143 This provides the government with 
considerable power in approving or disallowing FDI 
proposals.
Remarkable differences exist among the several 
screening systems designed. In some cases the scree-
ning system is solely designed to protect the national 
security of  the country against potential harmful FDI; 
this would be the case of  the US. On the contrary, other 
states refer to broader goals, such as the protection of  
“national interest”, like in Australia.144 Or require the 
investment to be of  “the net benefit” of  the host coun-
try, as happens in Canada. In other nations, like France, 
the freedom of  movement of  capital and of  investment 
coexist with the existence of  some ideas of  “economic 
patriotism” applied to filter some FDI projects. Some 
countries, like Germany do not have any special rule 
as regards sovereign driven FDI, whereas this kind of  
FDI is subject to a particular treatment in countries like 
Canada or the US. Also the designation of  specific in-
dependent organisms in some countries –CFIUS in the 
US- contrasts with the broad powers granted to the go-
141  O’BRIEN, Justin; GILLIGAN, George; GREENACRE, 
Jonathan. The Great Game Rebooted or the Long March to Acceptance? The 
Legal and Policy Impediments to Chinese Investment in Australian 
Corporations and Business Opportunities, The University of  New 
South Wales School of  Law, Centre for Law, Markets and Regula-
tion, CLMR Research paper series, Working Paper No. 12-4, Sydney, 
November 2012. p. 17.
142  AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. The Treasury, Govern-
ment tightens rules on foreign purchases of  agricultural land. Joint media 
release with The Hon Tony Abbott MP, Prime Minister and The 
Hon Barnaby Joyce MP, Minister for Agriculture, Canberra. 
05.2015. Available in: <http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-
release/005-2015/>. Access on: 12 Jul. 2018.
143  FRIGON, Matthieu. The Foreign Investment Review Process in 
Canada. Publication No. 2011-42-E12 July 2011 Revised 21 July 
2014. Ottawa: Background paper, Library of  Parliament/Biblio-
thèque du Parlament, 2014. p. 9.
144  COBAU, John, “Legal Developments in U.S. National Secu-
rity Reviews of  Foreign Direct Investment (2006–2008)’. In: SAU-
VANT, Karl P.; SACHS, Lisa E.; SCHMIT Jongbloed, Wouter P. F. 
(Ed.). Sovereign Investment. Oxford: Concerns and Policy Reactions, 
OUP, 2012. p. 107.
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vernment in some other systems –Australia, Germany, 
France or the UK- in order to implement the process 
of  evaluation of  FDI on national security or related 
grounds.145 
The legal basis referred to for this evaluation on 
national security grounds varies from country to coun-
try too; reference to competition law as a mechanism 
to control FDI on national security grounds in some 
countries –in the PRC- is in contrast with the enact-
ment of  special rules as regards this issue –US, Ger-
many, France, Australia or, Canada-. These systems are 
envisaged in certain countries as a last resort instrument 
only applicable when no other legal device is available 
–the US-. As a matter of  principle these tools should be 
considered as last resort mechanisms usually dependent 
on the application of  other provisions and systems fo-
reseen in the host state to monitor the market or some 
specific areas of  it. The 2009 OECD Recommenda-
tion on Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment 
Policies Relating to national security explicitly supports 
this point. They should then be avoided when there 
are other existing measures adequate and appropriate 
to address national security concerns.146 Consequently, 
any system designed to control the entrance of  foreign 
capital into the country should then come into play only 
when those other systems designed to monitor the nor-
mal activity of  the market –free competition, transpa-
rency of  the financial market…- have already been ap-
plied and not previously or in addition to them, as if  it 
were a fully independent system applicable at the same 
time and level than the other ones. 
But this is not the case in many other countries in 
which the system interplays in different ways with other 
legal mechanisms designed in the host country. For ins-
tance, on the one hand FDI in companies’ shares that 
are listed on a stock or security exchange system will 
usually be subject to specific regulations and some con-
ditions may be imposed to them. Additionally they may 
be subject to other applicable rules like those of  com-
petition law which are used to prevent dominant firms 
145  JACKSON, James K. The Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS). Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, 
RL33388, Washington, six March 2014. p. 30; UNCTAD. World In-
vestment Report 2016. Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges. New 
York and Geneva: United Nations, 2016. p. 94ff.
146  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Recommendation of  the Council on Guide-
lines for Recipient Country Investment Policies relating to National Security C, 
(2009)63 . Paris: OECD, 2009. Annex 3. 
–national and, in this case, foreign- to enter the market 
of  the host country,147 or in the case of  greenfield FDI 
the request for the investment to be made only through 
joint-ventures. They can also be submitted to the exis-
ting legislation on the privatization of  certain formerly 
public owned enterprises which may bar certain FDI 
from state controlled enterprises or allow it only after 
approval by certain institutions or those that create a 
certain kind of  shares with no sufficient voting rights to 
control the enterprise object of  the investment.148 As a 
matter of  fact, only when these rules have been imple-
mented should national systems on control of  FDI be-
come applicable. However, reality seems to be rather di-
fferent. For instance, the rejection in 2011 of  the bid by 
the Singapore Exchange Ltd. to acquire a major interest 
in the Australian Stock Exchange, both of  them private 
entities, was made not only on the basis of  the ‘FATA’ 
but also taking into account that the Corporations Act 
2001149 limits ownership by a person in the Australian 
Stock Exchange to a maximum of  15 per cent unless a 
special regulation is passed to increase this threshold.150
In addition to the existence of  different bases and 
goals in the designation of  the several existing national 
screening systems, as well as relevant disparities as re-
gards their institutional structures, also the concept of  
national security or security related industries on which 
they habitually stand varies from country to country; 
from narrow definitions to broader interpretations that 
extend investment review procedures to critical infras-
tructure and strategic industries. Countries do not pro-
vide a “clear-cut definition” of  national security in rela-
tion to foreign investment. Instead, in some cases only a 
number of  sectors or activities that may potentially pose 
national security-related threats from a national securi-
147  SORNARAJAH, Muthucumaraswamy. The International Law 
on Foreign Investment. 3. ed. Cambridge: CUP, 2010. p. 92.
148  SALACUSE, Jeswald W. The Three Laws of  International Invest-
ment. National, Contractual and International Frameworks for For-
eign Capital. Oxford: OUP, 2013. p. 121-2; UNCTAD. The Protection 
of  National Security in IIAs. UNCTAD Series on International Invest-
ment Policies for Development. New York/Geneva: UNCTAD/
DIAE/IA/2008/5, UNCTAD, 2009. p. 14.
149  Corporations Act 2001, No. 50, 2001 s 850B.
150  Note, Singapore finally walks from ASX bid, The Sydney Morning 
Herald (on line), 8 April 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/business/
singapore-finally-walks-from-asx-bid-20110407-1d6o4.html> ac-
cessed 16 December 2017. See BATH, Vivienne. “Foreign Invest-
ment, the National Interest and National Security – Foreign Direct 
Investment in Australia and China”. Sydney Law Review, v. 5, n. 34, 
p. 8, 2012. 
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ty stand-point are identified.151 Finally, the content and 
depth of  the screening procedure and the degree and 
amount of  information required from the investor is 
different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.152 In addition 
to these factors, potential consequences for investments 
considered to be problematic from a national security 
perspective vary and include full or partial investment 
prohibitions and the possibility of  final approval under 
certain –present or future- conditions. 
Screening systems developed by national legislators 
have mainly focussed in relation to M&As proposals, 
mostly in the infrastructure, telecommunications, fi-
nance and energy sectors, with special intensity in tho-
se cases in which the foreign acquirer is controlled or 
owned by a foreign state.153 As figures of  the practical 
implementation of  national screening systems show, 
these systems should not “strike terror into the hearts 
of  foreign direct investors”154. However, and despite 
existing statistics, they are said to play an additional sub-
tle role as regards potential foreign direct investors in 
so far they both foster the self-constraint and control 
by foreign investors as regards the goals and conditions 
of  their prospective investment operations, as well as 
their willingness to enter potential agreements with the 
administration of  the host country.155 
151  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT. World Investment Report 2016. Investor National-
ity: Policy Challenges. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2016. 
p. 94-5.
152  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT. World Investment Report 2016. Investor National-
ity: Policy Challenges. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2016, 
p. 99-100.
153  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPEMENT. Interim report approved by the OECD In-
vestment Committee at the fourth OECD Roundtable on Freedom of  Invest-
ment. National Security and “Strategic” Industries on 30 March 2007 
(reproduced in OECD, International Investment Perspectives: Free-
dom of  Investment in a Changing World. Paris: OECD, 2007. p. 55.
154  ZARING, David. “CFIUS as a Congressional Notification 
Service”. Southern California Law Review, v. 83, p. 81-106, 2009, as 
regards the US screening system.
155  ZARING, David. “CFIUS as a Congressional Notification 
Service”. Southern California Law Review, v. 83, p. 106-109, 2009 or 
BELLINGER, John B. III and Townsend, Nicholas L., “Inside ‘the 
CFIUS’: US National Security Review of  Foreign Investments”. 
Global Trade and Customs Journal, v. 1, n. 6, p. 1-2, 2011.–stating cer-
tain operations that failed because of  CFIUS- also as regards the US 
screening system. In the particular case of  the US, the delays derived 
from a CFIUS investigation and the potentially negative publicity 
that can be associated to such an investigation have negatively af-
fected some operations and have led the investor to withdraw them. 
See JACKSON, James K. The Exon-Florio National Security Test for 
Foreign Investment. Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, RL33312, 
States are increasingly imposing national security or 
related conditions on the entrance of  foreign investment 
into their territory on specific areas of  the economy or 
firms, or coming from certain countries or investors. 
Theoretically speaking these mechanisms should com-
bine procedural fairness with the protection of  sensitive 
information, and to ensure a level of  flexibility which is 
enough to offer protection from investments that ge-
nerate legitimate concerns at the same time that avoid 
political interference.156 However, and significantly, the 
different screening systems introduced usually corres-
pond with each other in the lack of  clear definitions 
of  some relevant notions on which they stand -natio-
nal essential security interests, national security, control, 
critical infrastructure…-, in the use of  some very vague 
guidelines or criteria to assert whether the investment is 
acceptable or not, and in the granting of  a broad power 
to the administration in order to perform the requested 
evaluation.157 
The drafting of  these screening systems has taken 
place in an atmosphere of  liberalization of  investment 
and their introduction has finally constituted a sort of  
exception to it. Consequently, any security related con-
dition imposed on foreign investment or any system de-
signed to evaluate it on national security grounds should 
be narrowly-tailored, focussing only on really genuine 
national security risks.158 And their use as an excuse to 
impose hidden limitations to free trade and investment 
should be prevented. Therefore, it is not the potential 
benefits for the host country arising out of  the FDI pro-
ject but the risks for the host state that it may generate 
that should finally be taken into account by these sorts 
of  schemes of  evaluation of  FDI proposals. However, 
the peril of  politicisation of  these kinds of  instruments 
Washington, 29 March 2013.  p. 10-14 providing some examples.
156  VANDERMEULEN, Jackie; TREBILCOCK, Michael J. 
“Canada´s Policy Response to Foreign Sovereign Investment: Op-
erationalizing National Security Exceptions”. Canadian Business Law 
Journal, v. 47, p. 392-394, 2009.
157  VANDERMEULEN, Jackie; TREBILCOCK, Michael J. 
“Canada´s Policy Response to Foreign Sovereign Investment: Op-
erationalizing National Security Exceptions”. Canadian Business Law 
Journal, v. 47, p. 394, 2009; SAFARIAN, A. Edward, “The Canadian 
Policy Response to Sovereign Direct Investment”. In: SAUVANT, 
Karl P.; SACHS, Lisa E.; SCHMIT JONGBLOED, Wouter P. F. 
(Ed.). Sovereign Investment. Oxford: Concerns and Policy Reactions, 
OUP, 2012. p. 446.
158  Statement of  the European Union and the United States on Shared 
Principles for International Investment of  April 2012 <http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/april/tradoc_149331.pdf> ac-
cessed 13 December 2017. 
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exists and the potential negative consequences derived 
from a broad interpretation of  the notion of  national 
security remain.159 
6. some fInAl IdeAs: A “long And wIndIng” 
futuRe to come
Practice currently shows the changing landscape of  
FDI and the existence of  some new attitudes maintai-
ned by certain countries as regards it that can finally 
affect the existing situation and its future developments, 
as well as the position and rights of  current and pros-
pective foreign investors. The empowerment of  states 
in relation to FDI may finally end up creating some 
short-circuits with the idea of  liberalization of  FDI, 
mostly when certain positions in favour of  the control 
or limitation of  FDI on different grounds by host states 
generalize and could lead to a new wave of  economic 
nationalism.160 It is necessary to build up a new equili-
brium among the need for freedom of  FDI, the right of  
states to ensure the preservation of  certain policies or 
the satisfaction of  some goals in their territory and the 
necessity for foreign investors to enjoy a clear and stable 
legal framework and a minimum level of  protection for 
their investments. 
The financial crisis, the change in the origin of  the 
FDI derived from the new geo-strategic reality arising 
out of  the crisis, the growing participation of  SCEs in 
international trade or the terrorism fear, amongst other 
reasons, have led many countries to set forth mecha-
nisms to evaluate FDI proposals before they are im-
plemented and not once they have been developed.161 
159  Thus, the White House statement on the US-China economic 
relations of  2015, explicitly states that, “The United States and China 
commit to limit the scope of  their respective national security reviews of  foreign 
investments (for the United States, the CFIUS process) solely to issues that 
constitute national security concerns, and not to generalize the scope of  such 
reviews to include other broader public interest or economic issues.  The United 
States and China commit that their respective national security reviews apply 
the same rules and standards under the law to each investment reviewed, regard-
less of  country of  origin….” (The White House. Office of  the Press 
Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Economic Relations, Washington D.C., 
25 September 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-us-china-economic-relations> 
accessed 22 November 2017).
160  UNCTAD. Investment Policy Developments in G-20 Countries, Divi-
sion on Investment and Enterprise. New York/Geneva: UNCTAD, 2009. 
p. 7.
161  Since 2006, at least eight different economies have introduced 
or reformed their legislation on national security based screening 
As a matter of  principle the protection of  national se-
curity would invite states to explore the temptation of  
adopting an isolationist stance towards FDI, although 
economic reality makes this possibility highly unrealistic 
nowadays.162 
This recognition should not impair the rights and 
expectations of  investors by reducing the predictabili-
ty, transparency, and enforceability of  the national and 
international investment framework. And this implies 
that when restrictive FDI measures are considered ne-
cessary to protect national security or to ensure certain 
security-related policy goals, states should ensure that 
these measures are adopted on a non-discriminatory ba-
sis and that they respect the principles of  transparency, 
proportionality and accountability.163
Even today it is not possible to speak of  a global 
trend towards restrictiveness of  FDI. Perhaps the libe-
ralization of  FDI momentum has stopped but no evi-
dence exists that states have become significantly more 
restrictive since the emergence of  the global financial 
crisis in 2007.164 No sign of  backtracking of  investment 
policy reforms exists so far. On the contrary a conti-
nued reform impetus in countries which traditionally 
have been the most restrictive remains. Nevertheless, 
the development of  screening mechanisms in many 
countries of  the world usually on national security, es-
sential national interests or similar grounds could pro-
vide the future tool for this backtracking should the 
notion of  national security be broadly interpreted as 
to encompass economic strategic areas or firms. Sta-
of  FDI. (ie Canada (2009), China (2011 and 2015), Finland (2012), 
Germany (2017), Italy (2012), the Republic of  Korea (2006), Poland 
(2015), and the Russian Federation (2008)). See UNCTAD. World 
Investment Report 2016. Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges. 
New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2016, p. 95-6. On another 
level, this move comes together with efforts by certain countries to 
recalibrate existing or future investment agreements amid a trend 
to enhance the regulatory power of  governments and to lessen the 
rights of  investors. ALVAREZ, José E. “Contemporary Foreign In-
vestment Law: An “Empire of  Law” or the “Law of  Empire”?” 
Alabama Law Review, v. 609, p. 970, 2009.
162  MAMOUNAS, Joseph, “Controlling Foreign Ownership of  
U.S. Strategic Assets: The Challenge of  Maintaining National Se-
curity in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World”. Law and Business 
Review of  the Americas, v. 13, p. 382, 2007.
163  OECD. Building Trust and Confidence in International Investment. 
Report by countries participating in the “Freedom of  Investment” 
Process March 2009. Paris: OECD, 2009. p. 10.
164  THOMSEN, Stephen; MISTURA, Fernando. Is investment 
protectionism on the rise? Evidence from the OECD FDI Regulatory Re-
strictiveness Index OECD Global Forum on International Investment. Paris: 
OECD, 2017. p. 1-2.
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tes, mostly developed ones, are increasingly concerned 
about the potential non-economic goals of  sovereign 
FDI and of  the lack of  reciprocity in the country of  the 
investor. Additionally, MNEs may face limitations on 
outbound investment by their home states. No global 
restriction trend seems to exist today, but the future is 
not free of  dangers: “complacency” in this area should 
be avoided.165 
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